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LATIN-AMERICAN LAND REFORM: THE 
USES OF CONFISCATION 
Kenneth L. Karst* 
IN Latin America, every land reform is motivated principally by political demands for equality, for the redistribution of wealth 
and income. The statement is true even in those countries where the 
governments are hostile to the idea of redistribution. Palliatives 
that exploit the ambiguity of the word "reform" in such countries 
are aimed at appeasement of the demand for sharing the wealth. 
Landless peasants and landowners understand perfectly well; yet, 
many technicians and students of land reform continue to speak a 
different language, a language in which land reform means anything 
from agricultural rent control to the introduction of hybrid corn.1 
In part, talk of this kind is the product of sophistication. No 
responsible government can simply carve big estates into little ones 
and then stop. Once a decision is made to divide the land, stagger-
ing responsibilities fall on the government: agricultural credit and 
marketing, rural education and technical assistance, housing-none 
can be neglected. Those who administer such programs may be for-
given for emphasizing that their reforms are "integral," involving 
more than land distribution.2 Nevertheless, these other functions 
are secondary and dependent; all of the reforms have as their chief 
purpose consolidation of the redistribution.3 
"Land reform" is ·written into the Charter of Punta del Este, the 
basic document of the Alliance for Progress.4 But, even today, 
United States policy reflects some uncertainty about the content of 
• Professor of Law, The Ohio State University.-Ed. I am grateful to my col-
league, Professor William T. Burke, who criticized a draft of this article.-K.L.K. 
1. Those who speak for the United States Government frequently reflect this rather 
comfortable view. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T STATE, LAND REFORM-A WORLD CHALLENGE 4-5 
(1952); Henderson, U.S. Views on Agrarian Reform, 41 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 887, 888 
(1959). 
2. E.g., GIMENEZ LANDINEZ, EVALUCION DE LA REFoRMA AcRARIA ANTE EL CoNGRES0 
NACIONAL (Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria, 1962); Lleras Restrepo, Estruc-
tura de la Reforma Agraria, in TIERRA: 10 ENSAY0S SoBRE LA REF0RMA AcRARIA EN 
COLOMBIA 11, 13 (1962). 
3. The point has been made forcefully by a number of writers. See FLORES, LAND 
REFORM AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PR.OGRESS (1963); WARRINER., LAND REFORM AND Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1955); Barraclough, Lo Que Implica una Reforma Agraria, 15 
PANORAMA ECONOMICO 123 (1962); Carroll, The Land Reform Issue in Latin America, 
in LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: EssAYs AND COMMENTS 161, 162 n.l (Hirschman ed. 1961); 
Galbraith, Conditions for Economic Change in Underdeveloped Countries, 33 J. FARM 
ECONOMICS 689, 694-96 (1951). 
4. See text at note 8 infra. 
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that expression. President Johnson, on the third anniversary of the 
founding of the Alliance, employed this omnibus description: 
"Through land reform aimed at increased production, taking 
different forms in each country, we can provide those who till 
the soil with self-respect and increased income, and each country 
with increased production to feed the hungry and to strengthen 
their economy."5 
Since those words were spoken on a diplomatic occasion, perhaps 
they can be tolerated; they are indeed diplomatic, for they permit 
everyone to fill in his own preferred meaning for the statement's 
most important term.6 The reason for the ambiguity is that the goals 
of the Alliance contain a built-in conflict. 
The Alliance, as Fidel Castro boasts and despite regular official 
denials, was a reaction to the Cuban revolution. Its main purpose 
was to improve living standards in order to avoid violent upheaval 
in other countries; grants were to be conditioned upon the making 
of "institutional improvements which promise lasting social prog-
ress."7 It is not enough to protest that the Alliance seeks to improve 
health, nutrition, literacy, and housing because that is the right 
thing to do; it was the right thing to do a long time ago, but this 
country did it only after Castro's emergence as a revolutionary 
symbol. Social and economic development was thought to be a peace-
ful alternative to revolution, particularly revolution with cold-war 
overtones. It was recognized from the first, however, that an im-
portant cause of stagnation in the Latin-American economy was the 
land tenure structure. The Alliance proposed "to encourage ... pro-
grams of integral agrarian reform, leading to the effective trans-
formation, where required, of unjust structures and systems of land 
tenure and use; with a view to replacing latifundia [the large estates 
of the traditional landed oligarchy] and dwarf holdings by an equi-
table system of property .... "8 The phrase "where required" leaves 
5. Address by President Johnson, Pan American Union, March 16, 1964. JOHNSON, 
THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 8 (U.S. Dep't of State 1964). 
6. Dr. Thomas Carroll has noted a striking demonstration of ambiguity in our 
national policy in two speeches of Hon. Teodoreo Moscoso, one pitched to the "social 
justice" theme and the other playing down redistribution and emphasizing the modern-
ization of agriculture, "supervised credit and extension service, and farm-to-market 
roads." Carroll, Land Reform as an Explosive Force in Latin America, in EXPLOSIVE 
FoRCES IN LATIN AMERICA 81, ll2-13 (TePaske and Fisher ed. 1964). The leverage that 
the Alliance can bring to bear on Latin-American governments is discussed in Note, 
The Chilean Land Reform: A Laboratory for Alliance-for-Progress Techniques, 73 
YALE L.J. 310, 327-33 (1963). 
7. President Kennedy's Message to Congress, 44 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 474, 476 (1961). 
8. Charter of Punta del Este, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1961, p. 8, col. 3. 
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some political leeway, but the message nonetheless is clear: the 
United States is ready to support land reform. To most Latin Amer-
icans that means tedistribution on the pattern of the Mexican, 
Bolivian, and even Cuban models. 
A redistribution of wealth and income, however, cannot fail to 
produce a realignment of political power in the reformed countries; 
to prevent a Castro-style revolution, the United States is thus com-
mitted to encouraging a revolution that it trusts will be peaceful and 
made principally within the existing structure. Misery alone is not 
enough to make a revolution; revolutions are born of hope, not 
despair, and that is why Ambassador Stevenson's phrase, "the revolu-
tion of rising expectations," fits Latin America so well. The Cuban 
revolution and the Alliance for Progress have, in uncomfortable 
combination, raised hopes of varying kinds throughout the region. 
Thus, the question now is not whether Latin America will have a 
revolution, but rather what kind it will have.9 
Not the least of the tensions involved in the formulation of 
United States policy toward Latin America is antagonism between 
the need to make radical changes in land tenure structures and the 
interest of some North-American investors in preserving their hold-
ings in land. The issues here are not simple. We are not faced with 
the easy choice between the Nation's broad political goal of hemi-
spheric security and the narrow goal of profit for a few investors. 
Private investment is an indispensable ingredient of the Alliance's 
success. The Alliance, after all, aims to supply capital as the basis for 
sustained growth, and private foreign investment is plainly a key 
source of capital, one not lightly to be discouraged.10 It is sometimes 
said, not without cynicism, that the United States supported land 
reform in Bolivia because little or none of the land was held by its 
o·wn investors.11 Whatever the truth of that charge, this country 
has now placed its weight on the side of land reform, "where re-
quired," and, presumably, that does not exclude countries in 
which there are substantial North-American investments in land. 
There is no reason to assume that all or even most such North-
American interests will be affected by a land reform, 12 but it would 
9. See SZULC, THE WINDS OF REvOLUTION (1963). 
10. Mr. David Rockefeller has ably defended the view that the Alliance has given 
excessive emphasis to government-to-government assistance, failing to take advantage 
of private investment's full developmental potential. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1964, p. 
46, col. 4. On the role of foreign capital as an important transmitter of modem tech-
nology, see URQUIDI, VIABILIDAD ECONOMICA DE AMERICA LATINA 101-12 (1962). 
11. See FLORES, op. cit. supra note 3, at 10. 
12. See text at note 98 infra. 
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be foolish not to recognize that some such interests are bound to be 
affected. 
Although the political setting for land reform in Latin America 
is revolutionary, the reforming governments normally have not 
admitted to charges of confiscation. Normally, they have claimed 
to compensate the expropriated landowners. If not, then they have 
asserted some traditional "legal" justification for taking without 
compensation, such as that the government is merely restoring the 
land to its true owners. This article examines the legislative tech-
niques for taking land, showing their confiscatory operation. For 
many lawyers, the analysis would then be easily completed: confis-
cation is wrongful and must be condemned. Rejecting the implicit 
absolutism of that conclusion, this article inquires into the justifi-
cations that can be pleaded on behalf of selective confiscation as an 
aid in solving some of Latin America's economic and social ills. 
We begin with Mexico, both for historical reasons and because 
the theory of restitution it has employed is a good analytical starting 
place. Following discussion of the Mexican experience are analyses of 
two techniques of "compensation" that have been used by reforming 
governments in order to avoid making prompt payment of the 
market value of expropriated land. The justifications for confiscating 
certain kinds of interests are then considered through an examina-
tion of the legislative content of "the social function of ownership." 
That examination raises one last question: If the reforming govern-
ments of Latin America regard confiscation as legitimate, why should 
they try to hide what they are doing? In that context, the concluding 
discussion explores the borderland between useful rationalization 
and simple dishonesty. 
I. MEXICO: THE THEORY OF RESTITUTION 
Latin America's first effective land reform occurred in Mexico; 
it began in this century and reached its peak of redistributive activity 
only a generation ago. The Mexican reform was premised originally 
upon a theory of restitution. Madero's Plan of San Luis Potosi, the 
first basic document of the 1910 Revolution, included this promise: 
"let [the lands taken from the Indians] be restored to their original 
owners, to whom shall also be paid an indemnity for prejudice suf-
fered.''18 "Land and Liberty" was the slogan of the Revolution's 
13. Para. 3, Plan de San Luis Potosi, in FABILA, CINCO SIGLOS DE l.EGISLACION AGRAIUA. 
EN MEXICO (1493-1940), at 209 (1941); also in 1 SILVA HERzoc, BREVE HlsTORIA DE LA 
REVOLUCION MEXICANA 133, 138 (2d ed. 1962). 
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agrarian side, but the idea was hardly original. From the times of the 
Viceroys, throughout the colonial era and the first century of Mexi-
can independence, the restitution of land to the Indians was a popu-
lar theme.14 The very recurrence of the idea suggests that the various 
restorative decrees were carried out less than scrupulously. 
Encroachment on the lands of the Mexican villages was not just 
a matter of pushing the Ind.ians out, North American style. Because 
the indigenous populations of Mexico had been settled in agricul-
tural communities, it was more convenient to enslave them than to 
eliminate them. Encroachments on their land and on their personal 
liberty were thus inseparable parts of a single process, a process that 
began with a distribution of Indians among the conquistadors for 
use as slave labor15 and culminated in a series of dazzling legal moves 
aimed at "confirming" titles in a few landholding families.16 Thus 
14. The first official attempt to restore lands wrongfully taken from the Indian 
villages was made in 1535; by royal decree, the Viceroy of New Spain was directed to 
inform himself concerning the land and tax abuses that had been reported in Spain 
and to take action to return the Indians' land to them. Ccdula of May 81, 1535 in 
FAnILA, op. cit. supra note 18, at 18. For later decrees of the colonial era, see id. at 26, 
29, !l0, 42, 49, &: 58. 
15. The repartimiento was, literally, a distribution of Indians. When complaints 
were made against the system's inhumanity, the encomienda was invented as a substi-
tute. See McBRIDE, THE LAND SYSTEMS OF MEXICO 43 (1928). Indians were then "en-
trusted" to certain Spaniards who undertook to make them Christian. The royal decrees 
established safeguards for the Indians' persons and property: "[But soon] the system lost 
its original character and became simply a method of land tenure, since the colonists soon 
came to look upon the districts assigned to them as being virtually their own and to 
regard the native agriculturists as their serfs." Id. at 45. The allotment to Cortes was 
enormous. "The areas claimed must have amounted to not less than 25,000 square miles 
and contained a total population of some 115,000 people •••• " Id. at 47. Compare 
CRIST, THE CAUCA VALLEY, COLOMBIA! LAND TENURE AND LAND USE 15 (1952), describ-
ing the use of Indians as agricultural workers for the haciendas and as pack animals 
on mountain trails. 
16. Titles to the encomienda lands were confirmed in periodic surveys, during 
which each rightful possessor was entitled to a composicion, a settlement or confirma-
tion of his title. The village leaders were often unaware of the necessity for securing 
composiciones. Unconfirmed village lands were then subject to occupation as Crown 
lands, and might later be confirmed in new surveys. In the early eighteenth century, a 
decree authorized the denunciation of illegal (unconfirmed) occupancies by persons 
having knowledge of them, who might themselves claim the lands upon the payment of 
a fee. See FABILA, op. cit. supra note 18, at 84; WHETIEN, RURAL MEXICO 82-85 (1948). 
The war for independence from Spain began in 1810 partly as a social revolution. 
Father Hidalgo sought the Indians' support in these terms: "Will you make the effort 
to recover from the hated Spaniards the lands stolen from your forefathers three 
hundred years ago?" Quoted in GRUENING, MEXIco AND rrs HERITAGE 80 (1928). But the 
great landowners and their allies captured the revolution and the succession of govern-
ments that followed it. After the brief mid-century flirtation with reform (see note 18 
infra), Mexico's government returned to normal. Under the Diaz regime (1876-1910), 
new devices were invented for despoiling the villages: A law for colonization of "idle" 
lands was interpreted to permit new denunciations and claims, after the fashion of the 
composicion; the private control of water rights permitted land companies to stop the 
supply of water to the villages, forcing them to abandon their land, which might then 
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were born the haciendas, the great estates that have been the chief 
target of land reformers in Mexico and throughout Latin America.17 
Curiously, the centralizing of land ownership not only survived 
during the mid-nineteenth century Reform movement, but it even 
accelerated.18 Thus, until the Revolution of 1910, virtually nothing 
of a serious nature was done to restore the village lands. 
That Revolution also began as just another political revolt, but 
it soon took on an agrarian cast. Now the promise of land to the 
villages began to be carried out by revolutionary generals such as 
Zapata, who seized land and divided it among the campesinos.19 Yet, 
even in the midst of civil war, Zapata recognized the need for estab-
lishing the legitimacy of his land distributions. His Plan of Ayala 
proposed the restitution of village lands that had been usurped and 
the expropriation (compensated) of one-third of the great estates for 
distribution among the landless who had no claim of restitution.20 
Zapata and others may be excused for failing to specify in detail 
the kinds of usurpation that would justify restitution; they were con-
cerned primarily with getting and holding support for the Revolu-
tion, and one does not issue a call to arms in the language of a statute. 
As the Revolution continued, many of the great estates were simply 
occupied, either by the campesinos or by revolutionary generals, 
without the formality of court decrees or legislation. "Restitution 
dates from the days the peasants seized land forcibly and then sought 
legal justification."21 
be occupied; the army destroyed some villages in punishment for "rebellion," and 
political friends of the regime moved in. SIMPSON, THE EJmo: MEJaco's WAY OUT 29-31 
(1937). 
17. FORD, MAN AND LAND IN PERU 21-52 (1955); McBRIDE, op. dt. supra note 15, at 
25-81. 
18. A mortmain law, enacted in 1856 to break the power of the Church, was directed 
at corporate landholdings, with an exception for village communal lands. Art. 8, Ley 
de Desamortizaci6n de Bienes de Manos Muertas, June 25, 1856, in FABILA, op. cit. 
supra note 13, at 103, 104. The constitution of 1857 omitted the exception in its article 
27 [TENA RAMIREZ, LEYES FUNDAMENTALES DE MEXICO, 1808-1957, at 606, 610 (1957)] and 
was interpreted to apply to the villages as well as to other corporate owners. The 
resulting fragmentation of village lands led directly to their piecemeal purchase by 
speculators and their ultimate consolidation in the haciendas. 
19. See DIAZ SoTO Y GAMA, LA GuESTroN AGRARIA EN MEXICO 18-19 (1959). The word 
campesino is used instead of "peasant" because the latter word calls to mind images 
of the European peasantry, many of which are inappropriate in the Latin-American 
context. 
20. Paras. 6 and 7, Plan de Ayala, in FABILA, op. cit. supra note 13, at 214, 215-16. 
Paragraph 8 of the Plan proposed the confiscation of all lands of those who might 
oppose the Revolution; these lands were to be considered as war indemnity and 
were to be used to provide pensions for the widows and orphans of revolutionary 
soldiers. 
21. SENIOR, LAND REFORM AND DEMOCRACY 25 (1958). 
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The "seizure" or "occupation" frequently, even typically, 
amounted to nothing more than the expulsion of the supervisors 
who managed the estates for absentee landowners. In such cases, the 
Indians continued to work the lands they had always worked and 
continued to live in the villages that had been enveloped by the 
haciendas. The differences were that they no longer recognized the 
right of the former owners to the crops raised and the central build-
ings of the hacienda were taken over for community use as hospitals, 
schools, or other public purposes. 
In three different respects, this continuity of the people on the 
land adds justification to the claim of restitution. First, under these 
circumstances, restitution was less disruptive economically and 
socially than would have been a restitution that tore one group 
away from the lands it worked and replaced it with another group. 
Second, the persons to whom restitution was made22 were the 
very ones whose previous labor under conditions of near-slavery 
had contributed substantially to the value of the land. Finally, 
the presence of the beneficiaries on the land, along with the decision 
to make restitution to villages rather than to individuals, eliminated 
the problem of locating "lost heirs" of the victims of earlier despoil-
ment. 
However well-founded the restitution theory may have been, it 
basically functioned as a rationalization for the agrarian phase of 
the social revolution. If there had been no continuity of the kind 
described, if the descendants of villagers long ago despoiled had 
been scattered instead of bound to the land, then restitution would 
scarcely have been a popular theme. Social revolutionaries are 
concerned with making a social reform, not with the purification of 
titles, and the main thrust of the revolution was to give the land to 
those who were working it. What the restitution theory gave to the 
Revolution was a basis in traditional legality for the transfer of 
wealth and power to the revolutionary classes. 
Land reform legislation embodying the principle of restitution 
was first decreed in 1915,23 and then incorporated into the Consti-
tution of 1917.2.., Although it was emergency legislation-the military 
22. The land was distributed to villages, not individuals. However, most of the 
villages divided their lands into parcels that were occupied, although not owned, by 
the families that worked them. 
2!1. Ley Agraria de 6 Enero 1915, in FLORES, TRATADO DE ECONOMIA AGRICOLA 400 
(1961). 
24. Constituci6n de 1917, art. 27, in TENA RAMIREZ, op. cit. supra note 18, at 817, 
825 (text before 1934, 1945 and 1947 amendments appears in id. at 882-89). The consti-
tution is available in English translation, published by the Pan American Union. 
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phase of the Revolution did not end until 1920-the law spelled 
out the villages' rights to restitution in enough detail to make later 
amendment unnecessary. The rather moderate restitution provisions 
of the Agrarian Code that is now in force are, in all essentials, the 
same as those of the 1915 decree.25 
Arising as it did out of a violent social revolution, the law was 
remarkable for what it did not do. It did not restore to the villages 
the lands that were theirs at the time of the Conquest, or even at the 
time of Independence. It did not upset the composiciones, which 
confirmed title in outside usu;pers, except those made during the 
Diaz era.26 Three kinds of transfers were declared void: (1) transfers 
of village lands made in violation of the 1856 mortmain law and 
other related laws; (2) concessions made by the federal government 
after December I, 1876,27 that encroached on village lands; and 
(3) transfers or confirmations of title made in the course of boundary-
marking proceedings after December I, 1876, that encroached on vil-
lage lands.28 
The inadequacy of this restitution legislation was partly evident 
even to its framers. From 1915 on, it was recognized that the resti-
tution of lands to the villages would have to ~e supplemented to 
some extent by grants of land obtained by expropriation, for which 
compensation was to be paid. Just how much reliance would have 
to be placed upon expropriation was not at first recognized, perhaps 
because both the legislators and the public were generally familiar 
with the history of abuse that had attended the marshalling of lands 
for the great estates. It was easy to underestimate the difficulty of 
undoing four hundred years of official and private connivance. In 
25. C6digo Agrario de los Estados Unidos de los Mexicanos, art. 46-49. 
26. The 1915 law imposes the 1876-to-date limitations period noted in the text. The 
1917 constitution extended the period back to 1856 for all forms of illegal encroach• 
ment. In 1934, the constitution was amended to conform with the provisions of the 
1915 law, which provisions remain in force today. In fairness to those who drafted the 
1915 law, it ought to be said that the number of illegal encroachments after 1876 must 
have been far more significant than the number between 1856 and 1876. 
27. The date marks the beginning of the Diaz era. See HERRING, A HISTORY OF 
LATIN AMERICA 338-53 (2d ed. 1961), for an interesting brief account of Diaz' thirty-five 
year rule. 
28. An exception was made for village lands that had been allotted in individual 
parcels in compliance with the 1856 mortmain legislation provided that the owner had 
held title for ten years and that the area of the land did not exceed fifty hectares 
(about 125 acres). Simpson notes that, by 1892, the total public lands granted by way of 
concession to the land companies, largely in connection with their "survey" work, 
amounted to about one-fifth of the entire area of Mexico. SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 
16, at 27-28. 
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any case, although restitution was expected to be the main legal 
weapon of the land reform, it turned out to be secondary.29 
Some of the failings of the restitution legislation are apparent on 
its face. Most obvious is the cut-off point of 1876, the beginning of 
the Diaz regime. Even assuming the nullity of "encroaching" con-
cessions and confirmations of title made after that date, the legisla-
tion left intact similar transactions, equally wrongful, that had 
occurred earlier. Much of the villages' land had been swallowed by 
the large estates in the first two centuries of Spanish rule. The 
classical arguments in favor of limitations periods are unpersuasive 
in this context. First, the doctrinal underpinnings for prescription 
are weak. The communal lands of the villages have been, along 
with other public land, exempt from claims of prescriptive right 
at least since the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X.30 If it be argued that 
there must be a time of repose when old wrongs are beyond redress, 
then it is hard to see why the restitution legislation did not replace 
the old rule of imprescriptibility with a new, general limitations 
period, applicable alike to the villages and to other claimants. The 
law did permit the recovery-through prolonged and uncertain 
litigation31-of village lands that had been wrongfully occupied 
without the assistance of the state, even though the wrong might 
have been buried in the past. It impliedly carved out for protection 
those wrongful occupations that were effected before 1876 with 
the legal trappings of a composicion. I£ it be argued that a limitations 
period is necessary in order to avoid reliance upon ancient and hard-
to-produce evidence, the answer is that the solution adopted fails in 
29. "During the entire period from 1916 to 1944, only 6 per cent of the total land 
distributed was by the method of restitution." WHEITEN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 129. 
30. Ley 7a, tit. 29, Partida 3a. The Partidas were written in the middle of the 
thirteenth century, but were not officially recognized as a source of law until 1348. 
Although much of their content comes directly from the legislation of Justinian, they 
have had great independent doctrinal significance in Spain and in Latin America. See 
Lobingier, Las Siete Partidas and its Predecessors, 1 CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1913); Nichols,· 
Las Siete Partidas, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 260 (1932). The preamble to the 1915 law took 
note of the fact that the village lands had not been subject to the operation of prescrip-
tion; it was argued that the legal interests of the landowners were not invaded by the 
decree of restitution because they had never acquired rights in the land restored to 
the villages. 
31. Zapata's Plan of Ayala referred in its sixth paragraph to "venal justice" as an 
instrument of the great landowners in taking control of the village lands. See note 20 
supra. His deep distrust of the judiciary has carried over into the agrarian legislation 
only to the extent that expropriated landowners are disabled from seeking judicial 
relief, and even that restriction no longer applies to "small property" owners. When it 
is the villages that seek judicial relief (restitution), the obstacles in their path make it 
easy to sympathize with Zapata. 
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two ways to avoid such reliance. Not only were the villages permitted 
to rely upon old evidence to prove ·wrongful encroachments, but they 
were also required in every case-including those that came within 
the post-1876 period of limitations-to prove their own titles. Thus 
a village's rights depended upon its ability to produce a ragged and 
dusty document, hundreds of years old, the authenticity of which 
could only be guessed. There was a political motivation for the 1876 
limitation. By purporting to undo only the transactions of the outgo-
ing dictatorship, the Revolution's leaders could hope to avoid the 
hostility of large landholders whose rights were more deeply rooted 
in past dealings. Even that political judgment is now questionable, 
but at this distance it is hard to fault the revolutionary leadership 
for failing to make more sense out of the chaos that surrounded them. 
Another kind of wrong that the restitution legislation did not 
try to right was the sale of lands to speculators at manifestly unfair 
prices. The first provision of the 1915 law nullified transfers made 
in violation of the mid-nineteenth-century mortmain laws. The 
effect was to denounce a number of village lands and the claims 
that followed them as illegal mortmain holdings. The law did 
not, however, reach cases in which the villages "voluntarily" com-
plied with the current (pre-1910) interpretation of the mortmain 
legislation by fragmenting their lands into individual parcels, which 
were then purchased by speculators £Qr prices reflecting small frac-
tions of their value. Because the original principles of the Mexican 
land reform thus protected existing ownership to a degree that is 
astonishing in comparison with the theories of the land reforms that 
have since taken place in other quarters of the globe, it should not be 
surprising that these principles came to be ignored. 
The theory of restitution was a title theory, based upon rights 
of ownership. But the concept of ownership as the normal form 
of land tenure was a European import. Before the Conquest, only 
some of the nobility held private property in land; the right to use 
land was vital to the ordinary man, but he did not own it.32 Within 
the villages' common lands, individuals and families might have 
relatively well-defined rights of usufruct, but it would be misleading 
to describe them as owners. Perhaps for this reason, as well as others 
32. The nobles' land was transferable by sale or inheritance and worked by serfs or 
slaves who passed with the land upon its transfer. Commoners who were neither serfs 
nor slaves might hold inheritable rights of usufruct or might work the land under 
contracts of tenancy. See Caso, Land Tenure Among the Ancient Mexicans, 65 AMER. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 863 (1963) (Wicke translation). Cf. CHEVALIER, LAND AND SOCIETY IN 
COLONIAL MExlco 12-23 (Eustis translation, 1963). 
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already noted, when it came time to secure titles from the Spanish 
crown, many villages failed to recognize the significance of docu-
ments of title: 
"Some of them were too remote from contact with Spanish 
officials to make any attempt toward reforming their land 
system [i.e., confirming their titles]; some were not yet suf-
ficiently advanced in culture to appreciate the need of proper 
titles for their holdings. These unrecognized towns or loosely 
organized settlements continued to occupy their lands (when 
not absorbed into Spanish properties) during the colonial 
period and after the establishment of the republic. In fact, 
many such settlements exist today . . . , holding their lands 
collectively and alloting them to members of the village, with-
out titles of any kind save the rights established by occupancy 
or the testimony of chiefs and neighbors."33 
Thus, the trouble with the restitution theory was that it was not 
possible for most of the villages to prove their titles to the satisfac-
tion of judges.34 As a legal mechanism for effecting land reform, 
restitution was a failure. 
It would, nonetheless, be a mistake to write off the restitution 
theory as unimportant. It is true that not many villages recovered 
their lands in actions for restitution; instead, the lands were taken 
from the great estates by expropriation and were granted to the vil-
lages. While the 1915 law had seemingly added the expropriation-
and-grant device as an afterthought, the 1917 constitution was in-
terpreted to place the grant program upon an equal footing with 
restitution. Still, compensation was to be made in cases of grant, 
and the villages were to pay for the granted lands in installments that 
would be applied to the retirement of agrarian bonds issued as 
compensation to the landowners.35 That ultimately the villages did 
not pay and the landowners largely went uncompensated36 was not 
simply attributable to the new political force the villages found. In 
the background was the theory of restitution, giving rise to claims 
ll!l. McBRIDE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 125. 
ll4. The history of one village's unsuccessful efforts to produce title documents is 
recounted in SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 465-66. There are parallels in the experi-
ence of some of our own Indian tribes: 
"[Tribal lawyers] cautioned that rejection of [the federal government's offer of 
settlement] might lead to lengthy litigation that could deprive many living Indians 
of any share in the settlement, and might result in no award at all. 
"In a lawsuit, the lawyers said, the now widely dispersed Indians would have 
difficulty furnishing the requisite legal proof that their forebears a century ago 
occupied specific tracts under tribal organization." N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1963, p. 29, 
col. 8. 
ll5. See SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 218-19. 
ll6. See FLORES, op. cit. supra note 23, at 324-45. 
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of the most traditional kind-claims that might properly be recog-
nized, even though they could not be substantiated by records and 
proceedings in the usual European manner. This is not to say that 
there was no legitimate or legal alternative to recognizing and en-
forcing the villages' claims; the particular confiscatory solutions 
into which the Mexican Revolution fell were not compelled by pos-
itive law87 nor by some abstract "Justice." But one should not con-
demn those solutions out of hand as immoral or as lacking any basis in 
equity or legitimacy38 unless he is also prepared to deny the legit-
imacy of the villages' claims to restitution. 
II. CONFISCATION IN DISGUISE: DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
Some Latin-American land reform laws provide immediate pay-
ment in cash for expropriated land,39 and, while no such law ex-
pressly requires payment of the land's market value, statements con-
cerning value or price are sometimes interpreted as referring to the 
market price.40 More typically, however, the expropriating agency 
37. In an opinion that is both wistful and eloquent, Mr. Justice Jackson points up 
the futility of judicial remedies to right the wrongs done by white men to Indians a 
century ago. The opinion recognizes, however, that there are equities that are beyond 
enforcement in court which nonetheless deserve recognition: "Whatever survives is a 
moral obligation resting on the descendants of the whites to do for the descendants of 
the Indians what in the conditions of this twentieth century is the decent thing." 
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, !154, 355 (1945) 
(concurring opinion). 
!18. Two expressions of this kind, mined from the rich lode of the Congressional 
Record, are 84 CONG. R.Ec. 3805 (Remarks of Hon. Hamilton Fish, April 4, 1939) 
("robbery''); 86 id. at 5624-26 (Remarks of Hon. Dewey Short, May 6, 1940) f'theft," 
"piracy''). The main theme of the discussions here cited was the expropriation of 
North American interests. 
39. E.g., Honduras, Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 52, Decreto No. 2, Sept. 29, 1962, 
La Gaceta No. 17,843, Dec. 5, 1962, p. I; Panama, C6digo Agrario, Sept. 21, 1962, art. 
45. The Honduran law has been translated into English in the series on Food and 
Agricultural Legislation of the United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization; 
hereinafter, these translations will be noted: (FAO translation), and each basic reform 
law will be noted after the first reference only by the country and the article, as, 
Honduras, art. 52. 
40. The Colombian law was so interpreted before its adoption. See L6pez Michel-
sen, Hacia una 'flerdadera Reforma Agraria que Complete la "Revolucion en Marcha," 
in TIERRA: 10 ENSAYOS SoBRE LA REFORMA AGRAIUA EN COLOMBIA 85, 96-99 (1962); 
Lleras Restrepo, Estructura de la Reforma Agraria, in id. at 11, 71. The general refer-
ence to valuation, which does not specify market value, is in Colombia, Ley No. 1!15 
Sobre Reforma Social Agraria, art. 61, Dec. 13, 1961, Diario Oficial No. 30691, Dec. 20, 
1961, p. 801 (FAO translation). Seven months after the adoption of the law, an execu-
tive decree limited the appraisers to values not exceeding 130% of the assessed tax 
valuation for the preceding year. Decree 1904 of 1962, art. 1. The use of this source for 
valuation, discussed in section III, infra, had been proposed by some writers on the 
basis of a 1959 colonization law. See MORALES BENITEZ, REFORMA AGRARIA-COLOMBIA 
CAMPESINA 269-70, 275 (1962). An experienced North American observer calls this valua-
tion provision "perhaps the strongest one of the whole body of new legislation • • • ," 
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is authorized to defer payment (often by giving compensation in 
the form of agrarian bonds) and to consider factors other than market 
value in evaluating the land. By traditional North American con-
stitutional standards, either of these practices would violate require-
ments of just compensation.41 But, in view of the state of under-
development in which even the most advanced Latin-American 
countries find themselves, strict application of a standard of full, 
prompt, and effective payment would require the abandonment of 
a land reform.42 Laws that purport to require such compensation 
cannot be taken at face value: if the government intends to comply 
with such a requirement, it does not intend more than a piecemeal 
reform; if it intends to create a general nationwide reform, then the 
statutory requirement will have to be modified or violated. 
The extent to which deferment of compensation is confiscatory 
depends upon factors that go beyond those to be found in the stan-
dard accountant's tables: the length of the period of deferment, the 
rate of interest paid on the deferred obligation, and the going 
interest rate in the money market. In a time of continuing rapid 
inflation, a deferment of compensation for only a few years may 
amount to near-complete confiscation, even if the bonds that are 
given are made tax-exempt.43 It is possible to reduce the effect of 
inflation on compensation awards by providing for periodic read-
justments of the amounts due, tying compensation payments to a 
cost-of-living index44 or even to some constant value measured by 
a commodity such as coffee or sugar.45 But only rarely will the de-
HIRSCHMAN, JOURNEYS TOWARD PROGRESS 152 (1963). The landowners evidently agreed, 
for the rule was changed in 1963 to permit an owner to estimate a new valuation for 
future land tax purposes, which new valuation is also to be used in determining his 
land's value in the event of expropriation. Owners of rural land that exceeds one 
hundred hectares in area or twenty thousand Colombian pesos in value on tax registry 
books are required to make such estimates every two years; if they fail to do so, they 
are presumed to accept the existing valuation for expropriation purposes. An excessive 
valuation (over market value) is not binding on the acquiring agency, but the new 
scheme avoids the confiscatory feature of the 1962 regulation. Decreto No. 2895, Nov. 
26, 1963; Decreto No. 181, Feb. 1, 1964. 
41. 3 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 8.2, 8.6 (3d ed., Sackman, 1950). 
42. See text at note 122 infra. 
43. E.g., Colombia, art. 75: "Both the capital and the interest shall be free of all 
national, departmental and municipal tax other than income tax and other taxes 
assimilated thereto"; Honduras, art. 66: "The bonds ••• shall be exempt from pay-
ment of income tax ••• "; Peru, Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 230 (1964), La Prensa, 
Lima, May 23, 1964, pp. 11-14 (both bonds and interest free from all taxes). 
44. The Chilean constitution, recently amended to permit deferred compensation, 
now provides for "a system of annual readjustment of the balance of the compensation, 
with the object of maintaining its value." Ley No. 15295, Diario Oficial, Oct. 8, 1963. 
Cf. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 772 (1963). 
45. The land reforms in Taiwan and the Republic of Korea tied their deferred pay-
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£erred payments bear interest at a rate that approximates the high 
rates now standard in Latin America.46 (If high interest rates are 
simply a function of expected inflation, there is less need to match 
the market rate when the principal sum is protected against a fall in 
the value of money.) 
Not all deferments of compensation are equally confiscatory. 
Some agrarian bonds may be used at face value to pay taxes or other 
obligations to the government.47 Some bear very low interest, while 
others bear interest at the market rate.48 Some are issued for longer 
terms than others.49 Finally, the proportion of cash payments to 
bonds may vary.50 The standards by which these various factors are 
adjusted all illustrate a single principle: the closer the ownership of 
the expropriated land comes to fulfilling its social function, tsi by 
producing well and by treating the agricultural labor force fairly, 
the less confiscatory will be the taking.ts2 In addition, the extent of 
deferment of compensation may be roughly proportional to the size 
and value of the expropriated land.tss 
ments to the expropriated landowners to the price of rice or other commodities. A 
description of the Korean case appears in Bunce, Financial Aspects of Land Reform in 
the Far East, in LAND TENURE 481, 485-86 (Parsons, Penn &: Raup ed. 1956). Cf. Mallory, 
The Land Problem in the Americas, 43 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 815, 821 (1960) (references 
to Taiwan reforms). [For recent comment on certain Asian reforms, see Ladejinsky, 
Agrarian Reform in Asia, 42 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 445 (1964).] In Colombia, it has not been 
unusual for private borrowers to give "coffee mortgages," that is, to agree to adjust 
their future payments to the price of coffee. In such a case it should be noted that the 
risks of the commodity market are added to those of inflation. 
46. When inflation runs unchecked, interest rates also reach very high levels. The 
current rate in Brazil, for example, is upwards of forty per cent. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 
5, 1963, p. 13, col. 1. 
47. E.g., Colombia, art. 78 (payment for parcels bought in consolidation or coloniza-
tion programs). Cf. SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 227 (Mexico: tax and other pay-
ments); Peru, art. 235 (permitting the use of agrarian bonds to pay taxes in the year in 
which the bonds are redeemable). 
48. Venezuela, Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 174, March 5, 1960, Gaceta Oficial 
No. 611 Extraordinario, March 19, 1960, p. 1 (FAO translation); Colombia, art. 75 (both 
differentiating among various classes of bonds). 
49. Ibid. 
50. Venezuela, arts. 33, 178; Colombia, art. 75; Peru, art. 233. 
51. See section IV infra. 
52. Venezuela, arts. 27, 33, 174; Colombia, art. 62. 
53. Venezuela, art. 178; Colombia, art. 62. As these notes suggest, the Venezuelan 
and Colombian laws have done more to differentiate among the types of payment made 
to various expropriated owners than have the laws of other countries. Of course the 
interest rates, periods of deferment, proportions of cash payments, etc., vary from 
country to country, as do degrees of faithfulness of the government to the law's provi-
sions. In Mexico, for example, only a small fraction of the landowners received even 
the authorized agrarian bonds. FLORES, op. cit. supra note 23, at 324-36. In Bolivia, 
mortgage bonds (two per cent, twenty-five year terms) are authorized. Decreto Ley No. 
03464 de Reforma Agraria, arts. 156-57, Aug. 2, 1953. (FAO translation.) However, the 
bonds have not even been printed, and there is no present intention to issue bonds to 
any of the expropriated owners; "this phase of the land reform has been virtually 
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Transferability of the right to receive deferred compensation 
payments has also been limited rather strictly. The most favored 
classes of obligations, whether or not they take the form of bonds, 
are freely transferable,54 being limited in their marketability only 
by such standard market considerations as their rates of interest. In 
most cases of expropriation, however, the obligations of the govern-
ment either are not transferable at all or are transferable only on 
condition that their proceeds be invested in certain specified sectors 
of the economy.55 The main purpose of these limitations on trans-
ferability seems to be to avoid the inflationary tendency created by 
issuing a kind of second-class currency. 56 Allowing the transfer of 
agrarian bonds for specified investment purposes does not change 
the nature of the government's obligation. If, however, the govern-
ment permits an acceleration of payment on condition that the pay-
ment be invested in a certain way, the government in a sense 
becomes an investor for the benefit of the bondholder. 
Following Mexico's lead, a number of the Latin-American coun-
tries have made express provision in their constitutions for the 
deferment of their land-reform compensation payments.57 In fact, 
ignored to date." Heath, Successes and Shortcomings of Agrarian Reform in Bolivia 
in THE PROGRESS OF LAND REFORM IN BOLIVIA 16, 19 (Discussion Paper 2, Univ. of 
Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, 1963). Cf. Flores, Land Reform in Bolivia, 30 LAND 
EcoNOMICS 112 (1954); Flores, La Reforma Agraria en Bolivia, 20 EL TRIMESTRE Eco-
NOMICO 480 (1953). 
54. The class "C" bonds in Venezuela (art. 174), and the class "A" bonds in Colom-
bia (art. 62). 
55. An example of the latter feature is in Venezuela, art. 174: the less favored 
classes of bonds ("A" and "B") may be used to secure loans from official financial 
institutions "for agricultural or industrial purposes •••• " Otherwise these bonds are 
not transferable. In Peru, art. 236, agrarian bonds are acceptable as security for loans 
up to fifty, sixty-five or eighty per cent of their face value, depending upon the class 
of bonds; the loans are authorized for government banks, and no restriction is placed 
on their purposes, which are presumably to be evaluated in accordance with the banks' 
normal lending policies. 
56. See Galbraith &: Morton, Problems of Financing Land Distribution, in LAND 
T.ENURE 492, 496-97 (Parsons, Penn &: Raup ed. 1956). 
57. The draftsmen of the 1917 constitution of Mexico deliberately substituted the 
expression "by means of compensation" (mediante indemnizacion) for the existing 
language of art. 27, "with previous compensation" (Previa indemnizacion); in addi-
tion, the new article expressly recognized the agrarian debt. The recent amendment to 
the Chilean constitution (see note 44 supra) specifies a maximum period of deferment 
of fifteen years. Cf. Venezuela, Constitution of 1961, art. 101 (deferment "for a deter-
mined time" or payment in bonds "with sufficient guarantee'). In Cuba, the land 
reform law was issued by decree as an amendment to the constitution. See Cuba, Ley 
de Reforma Agraria, "final additional provision," June 3, 1959; CuBA AND THE RuLE 
OF LAw 98-99 (Int'! Comm'n of Jurists 1962). The most recent constitution to be 
amended for this purpose is that of Brazil; the Congress passed, by an overwhelming 
vote, an amendment expressly permitting payment in long-term bonds for land expro-
priated in the revolutionary government's land reform. See Kent, Farm Reforms for 
Brazilians, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 7, 1964, p. 8, col. 4. 
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the only country in which the constitutionality of a deferred com-
pensation scheme is open to question is Colombia, where the con-
stitution, in relevant part, provides: 
"For reasons of public utility or social interest, defined by the 
legislative power, there may be expropriation, by means of 
judicial decision and prior compensation. 
"Nevertheless, the legislative power, for reasons of equity, shall 
have the power to determine those cases in which there shall be 
no compensation, by means of the favorable vote of an absolute 
majority of the members of both Houses."58 
Some opposition legislators on the political left argued that, if the 
Congress failed to make a declaration of "equity" under the latter 
paragraph and failed to adopt the land reform law by a two-thirds 
vote, the supreme court might hold the deferred compensation pro-
visions of the law invalid.59 That view was opposed by members of 
the Conservative Party, some of whom, in the face of the quoted 
constitutional language, took the position that the constitution did 
not authorize any deferment of compensation.60 The view which 
prevailed was that, since the constitution authorized the withhold-
ing of some compensation under proper circumstances, "the greater 
include[d] the lesser power," and the Congress was free to provide 
for compensation in agrarian bonds. 61 But this reasoning ignores 
the plain no-compensation language of the constitution; while it 
is perfectly acceptable to argue that there is no necessity for a 
purely formal declaration of any reasons of equity, the two-thirds 
vote requirement is not a technicality and seems indispensable. 
III. DEBATABLE CONFISCATION: THE DILUTION OF MARKET VALUE 
Most Latin-American constitutions do not specify market value 
as the required basis for just compensation for expropriated prop-
58. Colombia, Constitution of 1936, as confirmed by plebiscite of 1957, art. 30. 
59. L6pez Michelsen, supra note 40, at 93-94. 
60. Tovar Concha, La Tesis Conseruadora Sobre Propiedad, in TIERRA: 10 ENSAYos 
SoBRE LA llEFORMA AcRARlA EN CoLOMBlA 235, 242-43 (1962). Other conservatives simply 
agreed with L6pez Michelsen on the need for a two-thirds vote; e.g., G6mez Hurtado, 
El Autentico Contenido de Una Reforma Agraria, in id. at 169, 184-85, which argues 
that a previous vote to dispense with the two-thirds rule in cases of "social" legislation 
did not cover most of the law's provisions. This emergency legislation, the constitu-
tionality of which is itself questionable, expired in December 1961; the land reform 
law was rushed to passage just before the deadline. See HIRSCHMAN, op. dt. supra note 
40, at 144, suggesting also that the combination of right and left opposition could have 
defeated a two-thirds vote. 
61. Lleras Restrepo, supra note 40, at 64. 
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erty.62 Taking advantage of these constitutional ambiguities, the 
existing land reform legislation tends to list market value as only 
one of a series of factors that may be considered in fixing compensa-
tion, along with declared tax valuations and capitalized-income 
values. 
As in the United States, Latin-American tax registries normally 
list land at a valuation well below its market value. Some supporters 
argue, upon frankly redistributive grounds, for tax valuation as the 
basis for compensation: this is one way to confiscate, and confiscation 
is needed if there is to be a reform.63 Another obvious argument is 
that the landowners have been paying property taxes determined 
by using the low base, and, therefore, ought not to complain if 
other dealings with the government are also based upon their own 
low declarations.64 The trouble with this second argument is that 
all property in the nation may equally be undervalued and property 
tax rates calculated with the universal understatement of values 
in mind; it is not fair to single out the expropriated landowners for 
punishment when their practice may not have been regarded as 
wrongful and when it may have been common to all property 
owners. 
A better argument would be that abandonment of market value 
is not confiscatory in a context in which the market-such as it is 
-is influenced by factors that do not deserve legislative recognition. 
Principal among those factors is the use of land as a defense against 
inflation. In the face of continuing deterioration of the currency, 
many who want to protect their savings buy land, using it as a 
"money box."65 If there is no real land market apart from this kind 
62. Typically the constitutions require "previous" or "previous and just" compensa-
tion. E.g., Colombia, Constitution of 1886, as amended through 1957, art. 30; Brazil, 
Constitution of 1946, art. 141(16); Bolivia, Constitution of 1945, art. 17. Similar lan-
guage in our own state and federal constitutions has been held to require payment of 
"market value.'' But see HAAR, LANo-UsE PLANNING 470-505 (1959), for an exploration 
of the complexities hidden in that simple phrase. See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny 
County in Perspective: Thirty years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. 
CT, REv. 63, 90-105. 
63. See letter of Fr. Gonzalo Arroyo, in MoRALES BENITEZ, op. cit. supra note 40, 
at 275. 
64. Ibid; cf. SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 225-26. The Chilean reform law 
achieve& a neat twist on this theory. If an owner resists the administrative valuation of 
his land and if for any reason the expropriation is later abandoned, then for all tax 
purposes in the future the land's value may be modified upward to the level of the 
owner's claim. Ley de Reform.a Agraria, art. 32, No. 15,020, Nov. 15, 1962, Diario Oficial 
No. 25, 403, Nov. 27, 1962, p. 2501 (FAO translation). 
65. See L6pez Michelsen, supra note 40, at 97. 
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of speculation,66 land prices will not reflect land's utility as a factor 
of production. 
The abandonment of market value as the standard for fair com-
pensation does not necessarily require its replacement with the tax 
registry value of the land. A more satisfactory standard might be a 
capitalization of the land's income. Since much of the expropriated 
land has been cultivated non-intensively, 67 the use of historical in-
come figures would not produce a valuation that matched the value 
of the land for the productive process; this could only be obtained 
by the capitalization of the land's potential net_ income, assuming 
the application of labor and other variable production factors to an 
extent that might realistically be expected of a conscientious man-
ager. Despite the fact that using hypothetical income figures of this 
kind might result in a "truer" valuation in economic terms, how-
ever, there is a certain justice in using the income or product that 
the owner has in fact produced, just as there is in using his own 
property tax declarations. If this be confiscation, it can be argued 
that the owner has asked for it. 
No doubt all of these considerations have had their influence 
in the drafting of those land reform laws that dilute the market 
value standard.68 "Value," like any other word, ought to be defined 
in the light of the purposes of the legislation; in this case,1 those 
purposes are the purposes that motivate the land reform. The his-
tory of the landowner's minimal contributions to the society, 
whether they have taken the form of low taxes, or an inadequate 
production, or even the abuse of the agricultural labor force, can-
not properly be ignored when the issue is the landowner's just 
desert. To call this kind of valuation confiscatory is to assume the 
conclusion, even though the assumption be cloaked in the rhetoric 
of market value. 
Who makes the valuation may be as important as the standards 
prescribed for determining the amount. In every case, the adminis-
trators of the land reform are charged with making at least a pre-
66. See text accompanying notes 88 &: 89 infra. Where there are similar artificial 
influences on market value, our own courts also may use other measures of just com-
pensation. See JAHR, LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN: VALUATION AND PROCEDURE 102-15 
(1953). 
67. See text accompanying note 80 infra. 
68. Venezuela, art. 25 (production history, assessed value, market); Costa Rica, Ley 
No. 2825 de Tierras y Colonizaci6n, art. 127, Oct. 14, 1961, La Gaceta No. 242, Oct. 25, 
1961, p. 4085 (FAQ translation) (upper limit: assessed value); Cuba 29, 30 (assessed 
value plus improvements); Peru, art. 75 (recent declared value for tax purposes, poten-
tial income, and expert assessment). 
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liminary valuation. Review of the administrative determination by 
an ordinary court or by a specially established agency such as an 
arbitration board is regularly provided.69 The Venezuelan experi-
ence suggests that reviewing judges have somewhat less hesitancy to 
substitute their own judgment when the question is the value of 
expropriated land than they do when the issue is the land's "affect-
ability" (eligibility) for expropriation.70 Independence of the re-
viewing body is plainly desirable but has always been difficult 
to achieve in Latin America. Zapata's Plan of Ayala, the document 
which served as t]:ie manifesto for the agrarian movement in the 
Mexican Revolution, noted the part that "venal justice" (i.e., 
corrupt judges) had played in the despoilment of the village lands.'ll 
Corruption tends not to be the most serious problem in the context 
of a land reform; the major threat is that judges will be under great 
political pressure to give their support to the reform and it will 
become hard to distinguish between that support and support for 
the position of the executive branch in a particular case. In Bolivia, 
many an "agrarian judge"72 has been a law student; but, however 
conscientious the judge, it may be asking too much to expect him 
to make an independent evaluation of the lawfulness of a decree 
signed by the President of the Republic. 
The theory of restitution offers an explanation for the uncom-
pensated taking of land that avoids frank recognition of the fact 
that the land is being confiscated. The same kind of anticipatory 
denial of the charge of confiscation is implicit in the adoption of 
schemes of deferred and reduced-value compensation. Since all of 
these legislative devices do result in uncompensated taking of land, 
the legitimacy of the takings must rest upon something more sub-
stantial than the pretense that confiscation is not involved. The more 
candid arguments in justification of confiscatory takings go directly 
to the function that land ownership performs in Latin-American 
society. 
69. E.g., Chile, art. 26 (special court); Honduras, art. 52 (Comptroller General); 
Colombia, art. 61 (three experts: one appointed by the owner, one by the Land Reform 
Institute, and one by a government geographical institute; if an objection to the 
arbitrator's finding is upheld by a court, then three more experts are appointed in the 
same manner and their decision is final); Cuba, Act No. 588 (regulating expropriation), 
art. 15, Oct. 7, 1959, Gaceta Oficial No. 191, Oct. 9, 1959, p. 22, 740 (FAQ translation) 
(arbitration); Venezuela, art. 36 (arbitration, subject to judicial review). 
70. Interview with Dr. Ing. Bruno Salazar Figueroa, Institute Agrario Nacional, 
Caracas, Venezuela, March 12, 1963. 
71, See note 31 supra. 
72. The post is established by art. 166 of the Bolivian reform law. 
346 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63:327 
IV. "THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF OWNERSHIP" 
With all of the passion of fresh discovery, Latin-American re-
formers have taken to the idea that private ownership implies a 
degree of social obligation. Duguit's old phrase, "the social function 
of ownership,"78 has in fact been written into several land reform 
laws. The idea that property should have to be justified by reference 
to its social function comes naturally to North American lawyers, 
who have subjected legal relations to the same kind of scrutiny for 
at least the past two generations. What is surprising, given the con-
ditions of Latin-American society during the same period, is that 
similar analysis has taken so long to be accepted in those countries. 
The tenacity of the civilian traditions against restrictions upon 
ownership perhaps can be explained as a result of the way most 
Latin-American lawyers have been trained.74 There the law, at 
least as it is expressed in the principal codes, is normally expounded 
and analyzed, even memorized by students, as a kind of holy abstrac-
tion. Basic legal institutions are conceived to be static rather than 
dynamic; a discussion of social needs and a discussion of the mean-
ing of the Civil Code, for example, would be kept in separate ana-
lytical compartments. Of course this is a caricature, exaggerated for 
emphasis, but the exaggeration is not too great.75 In such an atmos-
phere, it has been easy for nineteenth-century protections of in-
dividual economic freedom to become frozen into law and, equally 
important, frozen into both professional and popular ideas con-
cerning the nature of private ownership. 76 
73. See DuGUIT, I.Es TRANSFORMATIONS GENERAi.ES DU DROIT PRIVE (1912), translated 
by Register and excerpted in RATIONAL BAStS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 315, 317-23 (Wig-
more and Kocourek ed. 1923); cf. 2 ELY, PROPERTY AND CoNTRAcr IN THEIR RELATION TO 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 627-42 (1914). ' 
74. See generally Katz, Report of a Visit to Mexico and South America, July 8-Sep-
tember 5, 1961, to the Committee on Higher Education in the American Republics, 
1961. 
75. Partly as a result of the activity of CHEAR (see note 74 supra), important, but 
largely unsuccessful, efforts for improvement were recently made in two of Latin 
America's best universities, the University of Sao Paulo and the University of Chile. Of 
course many individual teachers are not guilty of the kind of barren instruction here 
described; but they are, unhappily, still a small minority. 
76. The Latin-American civil codes, largely taken from the Code Napoleon, recognize 
the limitation of "abuse of right," which, in its applications to property, roughly 
parallels the common-law maxim sic utere tuo. But it is important to remember that 
this limitation, like others, is regarded as an exception to the more general civilian 
tendency opposing restrictions on private ownership. Thus, a leading Argentine writer 
feels compelled to explain something that English or North American lawyers 
would never have doubted: that property is not really absolute. 8 SALVAT, TRATADO DE 
DERECHO CIVIL ARGENTINO 362-67 (3d ed. 1946) (citing DUGUIT, op. cit. supra note 73), 
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A. Legislative Standards for Expropriation 
'While similar performance of ~ocial functions might, with equal 
reason, be demanded of other property interests, at the present time 
in Latin America, talk of this kind has been largely restricted to 
ownership of rural land. There are few serious proposals for the 
expropriation of factories, corporate shares, or bank accounts.77 In 
identifying those functions that the ownership of rural land ought 
to perform, the usual practice has been for the draftsmen of reform 
legislation to cast their definition negatively: ownership fulfills its 
social function when it avoids creating certain anti-social conditions. 
The legislative catalogue of such conditions is thus an imperfect 
mirror image of a near-feudal society that is at once economically 
drowsy and politically restless. The statutory definitions of the social 
function concentrate on two fundamental features of the hacienda 
society: the failure to cultivate land adequately and the injustices at-
tendant upon the indirect exploitation of land through tenant 
farmers, sharecroppers, and the like. Any genuine effort to remedy 
these ills necessarily implies an attempt to destroy the system, and 
the draftsmen of land reform legislation know it. 
The classical hacienda is not run for a profit; rather, it is run 
as a country estate for an owner who is usually absent. "The haci-
enda is not a business";78 it is a symbol of wealth and power.79 
More than that, it is, or aims to be, a self-contained community, 
77. It is true that some Latin-American governments have recently begun to make 
noises about tax reforms; others have both threatened and carried out nationalization 
programs, principally directed at public utilities. The generalization in the text stands, 
however. One exception that may come to be regretted is the Cuban "urban reform," 
which confiscated landlords' property, particularly apartment housing, for the benefit 
of their tenants. Bearing in mind the experience of Mexico, which left urban holdings 
intact (see text at note 127 infra), it has been suggested that the Cuban government 
acted hastily in (a) failing to maintain an urban land base for capital formation, and 
(b) driving large numbers of trained middle-class and professional people into exile, 
instead of trying to win their loyalty as did the Mexican government. The point is 
tentatively made in FLORES, REFoRMA AGRARIA EN MEx1co 458-59 (Univ. of Chile 
mimeo 1962). 
78. MOLINA ENRIQUEZ, Los GRANDES PROBLEMAS NACIONALES 90 (1909). The comments 
that follow in the text describe the classical hacienda, not the plantations that raise 
cash crops for export. As Tannenbaum remarks, the plantation is more properly con-
ceived as a rural industry, rather than a traditional agricultural undertaking, at least 
when reform questions are being considered. TANNENBAUM, TEN KEYs TO LATIN 
AMERICA 77-94 (1962). For a discussion of one land reform in the context of a planta-
tion economy, see Note, Puerto Rican Land Reform: The History of an Instructive 
Experiment, 73 YALE L.J. 334 (1963). 
79. The hacienda has been described very well by the writers often cited in these 
notes: McBride, Simpson and Whetten. An excellent short description is contained in 
TANNENBAUM, op. cit. supra note 78, at 5. Concerning the inefficiency of absentee 
ownership, see SCHULTZ, TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE 118-22 (1964). 
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able to provide its own needs without recourse to the money econ-
omy. It neither produces primarily for the market nor demands 
things that can be obtained only for cash from the outside. In order 
to avoid paying cash wages, the hacienda permits some laborers to 
occupy dwellings and small parcels of land. In return, these workers 
and their families must furnish a specified number of days of work 
each week or month. Some cash wages are mythically paid, but they 
usually assume the form of credits on the books of the hacienda's 
store; in fact, the labor force lives at a subsistence level and is kept 
in a form of perpetual debt slavery.80 The sharecropping system 
serves the same purpose of avoiding a cash outlay for labor. 
The forms of such arrangements are various, but they generally 
amount to this: the landowner furnishes the land, and perhaps some 
of the seed, and the sharecropper furnishes his own labor, along with 
the labor of his family; the crop is divided between the owner and 
the cropper, and part-often all-of the cropper's share may go to 
the owner to repay advances of subsistence items. The hacienda is 
large enough in extent that there is no economic motive either for 
working all of its land or for cultivating intensively those lands 
that are worked. 
The conversion of such a regime to intensive farming, directly 
managed by the owner and subject to minimum legislative standards 
for wages and living conditions of the labor force, would amount 
to the destruction of the hacienda. Money would be needed in large 
amounts, both to satisfy the new wage regulations and to pay for 
the fertilizers and other ingredients of input required for intensive 
cultivation. In short, the owner would be required to operate his 
lands as a commercial farm. Farm land would be valuable princi-
pally as capital for the production of income and, therefore, would 
become the object of purchases and sales in a land market. (The 
market for hacienda lands has long been highly restricted; haciendas 
are normally inherited, occasionally acquired by marriage, but only 
infrequently purchased.) 
Although there are undoubtedly some undesirable features of 
absentee ownership that are beyond the reach of meliorative reforms, 
it is likely that Latin-American reformers would not object to a 
continuation of indirect exploitation if it were possible to eliminate 
80. The plight of the hacienda's workers was described in painful detail in a 
famous speech by Luis Cabrera to the Chamber of Deputies on December 3, 1912. The 
speech is widely reprinted: FABILA, op. cit. supra note 13, at 224; 1 SILVA HERzoc, op. 
cit. supra note 13, at 267; 2 LA CUESTION DE LA TIERRA 277 (1961). 
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certain abuses that are tied to the existing forms of tenure. The 
worst of those evils are: insecurity, both as to the duration of the 
tenancy and as to the recovery of investments in improvements 
during the period of tenancy; oppressive contractual ties binding 
the tenant to the landlord, who profits on the provision of input 
items, such as seed and fertilizer, and on the marketing of the crop; 
and lack of access to ownership. It is occasionally argued that, with 
enough money and trained manpower, a determined government 
(which itself has security of tenure) might solve all of these prob-
lems by regulation rather than expropriation. The hope for such a 
regulatory program stems from the possibility that it might obviate 
the need to give up the system of "private technical assistance and 
credit" that is provided by the present tenancy structure, along 
with some important marketing channels associated with landlord 
middlemen, all of which would have to be replaced following a 
more drastic reform. 81 
In Uruguay, just such a regulatory program seems to have been 
effective, and wholesale expropriations have been avoided.82 But, 
certain facts make Uruguay's situation unique: its population is 
highly literate, even sophisticated, by Latin-American standards; 
there is relatively little population pressure on its rural land;83 and, 
probably most important, the government is stable, and it is there-
fore possible to assume that programs that are instituted will be 
carried out, or at least given a fair try. This combination of con-
ditions is not duplicated in any other Latin-American country, with 
the possible exception of Costa Rica. Whether the reason be the 
absence of trained administrators or the reformers' suspicion of 
measures that they consider to be "half way," most Latin-American 
land reform laws authorize the expropriation of indirectly exploited 
lands as well as the regulation of agricultural tenancy arrangements. 
The legislative language that makes such lands "affectable" (subject 
to expropriation) ranges from the naming of particular types of 
tenancy or farm labor arrangements84 to the broad inclusion of all 
lands not personally worked, directed, and financed by their 
81. O'BYRNE, THE HONDURAN AGRARIAN REFORM LAw 3, 13-14 (AID Rural Develop-
ment Team Supplemental Report, 1963). 
82. Uruguay, Ley de 27 Abril 1954, Diario Oficial No. 14224, May 15, 1954, p. 155-A, 
modified by Ley de 22 Junio 1954, Diario Oficial No. 14227, July 19, 1954, p. 95-A 
(FAO translation). 
83. See .ABENSOUR, MORAL LoPEZ &: JACOBY, Los ARRENDAMIENTOS Romeos: PRIN-
CIPIOS DE LEGISLACION 58 (FAO Legislative Series No. 58, 1957). 
84. E.g., Colombia, art. 55; cf. Bolivia, art. 12. 
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owners.85 None of the definitions can be called precise, and all of 
them !~ave considerable room for discretion in their administration. 
A similar breadth of language attends nearly all legislative def-
initions of the other main aspect of the social function of owner-
ship: the rational cultivation of land. Expropriation is authorized 
when the land is "idle," or "uncultivated," or "notoriously badly 
exploited."86 Almost never does a land reform law specify in greater 
detail the quality or level of cultivation that will take land out of 
the expropriable class.87 The complaint is made that standards that 
are so vague are not standards at all, resulting in two principal un-
fortunate consequences: the selection of land for expropriation is 
left to administrative discretion, with no effective control over the 
administrator's conformance to legislative purposes, and the absence 
of standards frightens away new private investment in land.88 
Given the political history of Latin America, fears of administra-
tive abuse of discretionary power cannot be called groundless. Still, 
it is not immediately apparent how workable legislative definitions 
of adequate cultivation could be made more precise. A number of 
suggestions might be made for lending a greater degree of certainty 
to the selection of land for expropriation, but not one of them is 
much of an improvement: 
(I) The law might list the principal factors to be considered 
by the agency charged with the initial determination of affectability. 
For example: 
"In classifying an area of land as being inadequately farmed, 
the Institute shall take the following factors into consideration: 
situation in relation to large urban centers; relief; quality of 
85. E.g., Venezuela, arts. 19, 20; Honduras, art. 7(a); cf. Peru, arts. 16-19. 
86. Colombia, art. 55 ("uncultivated," "inadequately farmed"); Venezuela, art. 19 
(failure to maintain "efficient exploitation and profitable use," "to bring usefully into 
play the productive factors thereof, according to the zone in which it is located and 
its special characteristics''); Honduras, art. 7 (failure "to operate efficiently"); Costa 
Rica, art. 120 ("uncultivated''); Peru, art. 14 ("idle or uncultivated''); Chile, art. 15 
("abandoned," or "notoriously badly exploited''). Cf. Bolivia, art. 25 ("undeveloped or 
substantially under-developed''). 
87. Article 29 of the Honduran law makes a slight concession in this direction, 
exempting stock-raising land when it is bounded and grazing one head of cattle (or 
five of sheep, etc.) for each two hectares. 
88. O'BYRNE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 3-5, 10-11. "The United Fruit Co., a com-
pany which has made and is making great contributions to the economy of Louisiana 
and my home city of New Orleans, has made it clear to the Government of Honduras 
that it will make no new investment in Honduras should this law pass." 108 CoNG. 
REc. A7959 (1962) (extension of remarks of Hon. Hale Boggs, largely devoted to a 
reprint of a speech of Mr. Victor C. Folsom of the United Fruit Co.). The fate of the 
Honduran law in the wake of the October 1963 "anti-Communist" military revolution 
is not yet apparent. 
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the soil; possibility of irrigation and reclamation; possibility of 
continuous and regular use; type and intensity of fanning; 
capital and labor employed on the farm; commercial value and 
yield of the property and population density in the rural area 
where the property is situated."89 
Such a check-list is useful, but it adds little precision to the expres-
sion "inadequately fanned," either for the purpose of limiting the 
Institute's discretion or to reassure a potential agricultural investor. 
(2) Lands might be classified administratively and minimum 
production levels established for various types of crops according 
to the classification. Although such a scheme, if coupled with a 
system of administrative or judicial review of challenged classifica-
tions, might provide the necessary minimum of assurance for in-
vestors, it would be impossible to administer, at least at the outset 
of any fundamental refonn.90 Reforming governments have all they 
can do to make the sort of piecemeal classifications that are required 
in each case of expropriation resulting from "inadequate" cultiva-
tion. 91 Also, a classification scheme that sought to cover any substan-
tial part of a country's private land would not simply be expensive; 
it might be impossible to make the classification because of a per-
sonnel shortage, which is likely to continue well beyond the initial 
phases of expropriation and distribution of land. 
(3) Standards that are phrased in terms of "average" levels of 
productivity92 are equally unspecific, unless account is also taken 
89. Colombia, art. 56. Honduras, art. 56 is copied from the Columbian provision. 
90. The expression "fundamental" is used to distinguish redistributive reforms 
from reforms such as colonization, tenancy regulation, and the like, which do not 
involve significant changes in the pattern of distribution of agricultural income. Such 
a reform, if it is to be carried out at all, had better be done fairly rapidly; if reform 
talk goes on for a long time, agricultural investment is apt to fall just because of the 
uncertainty of the owners' position. The latter point is made frequently by Dr. 
Edmundo Flores, who served with FAO as an adviser to the Bolivian government; 
his advice was followed. See Flores, Land Reform in Bolivia: An Informal Discussion, 
in THE PROGRESS OF LAND REFORM IN BOLIVIA 4 (Univ. of Wisconsin Land Tenure 
Center Discussion Paper 2, 1963). A fundamental reform that is rapidly accomplished 
will make its distributions before an "adequate" administrative staff can be a~embled, 
let alone trained. 
91. Nonetheless, many of the reform laws make provision for national cadastres, 
surveys, and registers. E.g., Honduras, arts. 207-16; Venezuela, arts. 166-71, 198, 203-04. 
The Venezuelan classification is still far from complete; lands are classified whenever 
they are the subject of expropriation proceedings, and the classifications are used in 
determining whether the ownership is fulfilling its social function. For the record in 
one such case, see !NsrlTOTO AGRARIO NACIONAL, Au:GACION y PREUBA DE LA FuNCION 
SocIAL (1962) (references to classification in the judge's opinion at 88-89). 
92. See Cuba, art. 2 (exemption for sugar plantations producing at least fifty per 
cent over the national average yield); Chile, art. 15 ("levels below those of normal 
productivity''); cf. the 1960 progressive tax law of the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil, which 
exempted "rationally cultivated" land on which the workers were supplied with 
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of the character of the soil and other factors such as those noted in 
paragraph (I) of this list. Such standards will also fail to achieve the 
objective of radically increasing production unless they require 
production in multiples of the average levels of preceding years; 
if the hacienda economy has not produced well, it will not do to 
accept past production levels as models for the future. However, 
at the same time, there is an obvious unfairness in selecting a pre-
viously productive estate for expropriation just because it cannot 
double or treble its own past successes. These difficulties suggest that 
a standard based upon average production is workable only when 
the land in question has been classified and its present production 
is measured against averages for its class; thus, the administrative 
difficulties associated with classification still are not avoided. 
(4) In Mexico, since the adoption of the Aleman administration's 
1947 amendments to the constitution and the Agrarian Code, it 
has been possible for holders of exempt small properties93 to obtain 
from the government certificates of non-affectability, immunizing 
them from expropriation and entitling them to judicial protection 
in the event of administrative disregard of their immunity.94 It has 
been tentatively suggested that a similar immunity might be given 
to land that is fulfilling its social function, principally for the pur-
pose of making the land safe for investment.95 But, while measure-
ments of land area tend to stay the same, the adequacy of cultiva-
tion of the land is less constant. And once a system of periodic 
inspection is added, along with the possibility of revocation of the 
immunity, much of the reason for a certificate of non-affectability 
is lost. From the investor's viewpoint, there is little security in an 
immunity that can be withdrawn if some official makes a new 
certain minimum facilities, on which soil conservation measures were taken, etc. The 
regulations defined "rational cultivation" in terms of above-average production. Decree 
No. 38,828, art. 18, § 1, April 14, 1961. See note 134 infra. 
Under the new Peruvian law (arts. 23, 31, 34), a landowner may increase the area 
which he reserves from expropriation if his exploitation of the land has exceeded 
by a specified percentage (25% or 30%) the average per-hectare figures in his region 
or valley in four out of the following five departments: (a) production; (b) capital 
investment; (c) labor costs, including housing and other "indirect" wage equivalents; 
(d) taxes paid; and (e) stimulation of agricultural development. The latter element is 
not specifically defined. 
93. Up to one hundred hectares of irrigated land, or correspondingly larger parcels 
of land that is less favored, may be immunized. Each member of a family may be a 
small property owner, entitled to a certificate; the result is that there are many large 
holdings in Mexicq that are exempt from affectability. 
94. Mexico, Constitution of 1917, art. 27, paras. XIV, XV. See also Reglamento de 
Inafectabilidad Agricola y Ganadera, Aug. 14, 1947, Diario Oficial, Aug. 16, 1947. 
95. O'BYRNE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 3. 
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determination that the cultivation of the land fails to meet the 
statutory standard, which is itself susceptible to more than one inter-
pretation. A minimum term for immunity that would be acceptable 
to potential investors (for example, five years), however, would 
probably be regarded as too long by a reforming government. 
Although there is not much that can be done to improve upon 
the rather vague statutory standards of adequate cultivation, it might 
still be possible to secure an increased measure of certainty, or at 
least consistency, by providing for review of determinations of 
affectability, either at a higher level of administration96 or in court. 
However, there should be no illusions about the supposed advan-
tages of judicial review. Those advantages all rest upon assumptions 
concerning the judiciary's independence that simply are not valid in 
the Latin-American context. Even when an individual judge wishes 
to be independent, there is an undeniable tendency to rely upon 
the technical evaluations of the government's agronomists, who are 
apt to be the only experts consulted in an expropriation proceed-
ing.97 And, when the legislative standards are so broad, the modest 
goal of consistency of treatment is difficult even for judges to achieve. 
Despite those serious problems, some form of higher-level ad-
ministrative review of affectability determinations is justified. Ad-
ministrators who know that their determinations will be examined 
(if only by other administrators) probably will try harder to follow 
the statutory standards, even if those standards are less than precise. 
Furthermore, the reviewing officer or board will construct over a 
period of time a body of knowledge or experience that is concen-
trated upon the application of the statutory standards. Officials 
who make the initial determinations of affectability, however, are 
prevented from concentrating their attention upon the legal issues 
in such cases, because in every case of expropriation their responsi-
bility extends to a great number of other functions. Nonetheless, 
since the cost of administrative review is relatively low, any govern-
ment undertaking a land reform should not fail to secure whatever 
degree of concentrated attention and consistency such a review might 
afford. 
Conscientiously applied, the "social function" standard would 
96. Radical reformers in Mexico bemoan the fact that the normal expropriation 
procedure requires the concurrence of both the state governor and the president of 
the Republic. More review means more opportunity for the exercise of political 
influence to delay or entirely defeat a distribution. 
97. The Venezuelan case referred to in note 91 supra is a good illustration of the 
government's monopoly on expertise. 
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not reach most North-American land investments. This country's 
investors have not put their money in the hacienda system, but, 
instead, have financed commercial agriculture. Typically, plantation 
products-principally bananas and sugar-are raised for export.98 
These enterprises generally cannot be criticized on grounds of eco-
nomic inefficiency; they are generally highly efficient, producing a 
good profit on their investment.99 Land reform, conceived as the 
division of large estates into small ones, makes no sense in such a 
context. A family simply could not efficiently operate its share of a 
banana plantation. Thus, the inevitable result of such a break-up of 
plantation holdings would be a severe drop in production; and, since 
these crops are often the countries' principal sources of foreign ex-
change, a sudden production decrease might be disastrous for the 
entire economy. 
There are, however, some points at which North American agri-
cultural interests may be influenced by programs labeled "land re-
form." In the long run, it is probably to the advantage of a country 
whose economy is dominated by one or two export products to 
diversify. Just as Venezuela needs to "sow petroleum," using oil 
money to lay the foundation for a more broadly-based economy, so 
the Central-American countries may need to lessen their depend-
ence on bananas and coffee.100 It may be thought wise to change 
gradually a substantial portion of such a country's agriculture to the 
production of crops necessary to feed a growing domestic popula-
tion. In such a situation, the government may add to the content of 
the "social function" test a requirement of not only intensive or 
efficient farming, but also of farming the "right" crops. Although 
expropriation is by no means necessary to achieve this change, it 
98. United States agricultural investment in Latin America has recently been con-
centrated in Central America and the Caribbean. Before the Cuban confiscations, 
nearly half of such investment was in Cuba, and about forty per cent was in Central 
America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INVEST· 
MENTS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY 148-49 (1957). United States investment in 
Latin-American agriculture declined during the period 1929-1940, no doubt partly as 
a result of takings of land in the Mexican land reform. Since 1940, the total value of 
such direct investments has steadily increased; agricultural investment is now dwarfed, 
however, by North-American investment in petroleum, mining, and manufacturing. 
Id. at 111; cf. INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (OAS), FOREIGN INVEST• 
MENTS IN LATIN AMERICA (1955). 
99. Concerning profits, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, op. dt. supra note 98, at 111, 
121. Even severe critics admit the economic efficiency of the foreign-owned plantations. 
See FLORES, TRATADO DE ECONOMIA AGRICOLA 279-99 (1961). 
100. In the short run, a decision to make a sudden conversion to a diversified agri-
culture may be most unwise, as recent Cuban experience suggests. 
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may be used as a threat, an ultimate sanction to be applied in the 
event of noncompliance with the national food policy. 
Beyond that long-range concern about the plantation economy, 
there is the obvious and immediate concern for fair labor relations. 
Agricultural companies from North America employ workers in 
significant numbers.101 Whether or not it is wise policy, it surely is 
not unconscionable to include in the definition of "social function" 
a standard of substantial compliance with laws protecting agricul-
tural labor.102 A change in land tenure structures is made, not for 
its own sake, but rather for the purpose of changing relations among 
men. Therefore, if the hacienda system may legitimately be abol-
ished for the purpose of redistributing agricultural income, it can-
not be less legitimate to use expropriation as a threat to force a 
redistribution in the form of better wages and working conditions 
in the plantation setting. Objection to this by some United States 
investors in Latin-American agriculture is surprising, considering 
the liberality of their labor policies as those policies are described 
in the "authorized" company biographies.103 
Land reform thus appears not to be a serious threat to the con-
tinuation of United States agricultural investment in Latin America 
so long as the "social function" test is the real test for affectability 
of land.10t But, with regard to such investment, it is likely that the 
reforming countries will adopt measures short of expropriation. 
Just as Venezuela has taxed, rather than expropriated, North Ameri-
can oil investments, investors in agriculture can expect tougher 
bargaining over taxes, concessions, prices, labor costs, and the like. 
This kind of tightening is not fairly equated with confiscatory 
takings on the Cuban model, and the tone of the complaints of 
investors threatened by higher taxes and harder bargaining is more 
than a little reminiscent of the rumblings about Bolshevism that 
accompanied the domestic business regulation of the 1930's.105 
101. North American agricultural interests employ about the same number of 
persons in Latin America as do North American manufacturing companies, although 
direct investment in manufacturing is about two and one-half times greater in dollar 
amount. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, op. cit. supra note 98, at 111, 122. 
102. The term "unconscionable" is used in this connection in O'BYRNE, op. cit. 
supra note 81, at 11. 
103. See, e.g., MAY &: PLAZA, THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY IN LATIN AMERICA 200-09, 
243-43 (7th case study on United States Business Performance Abroad, National Plan-
ning Association, 1958). 
104. In Cuba, of course, the real tests for affectability were political, and virtually 
all United States interests were confiscated. See note 143 infra. 
105. See Folsom, The Outlook for the Alliance for Progress-1964, 8 A.B.A. SECTION 
OF INT'L AND CoMP. L. BuLL. 21 (1964). 
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B. The Argument for Selective Confiscation 
The "social function" test, while aimed at eliminating the 
hacienda system, 106 is not in itself confiscatory; it is used to make 
the selection of land for expropriation, and the question of com-
pensation is arguably separable. But, given the compensation formu-
las that have been adopted into the same reform legislation, almost 
all expropriation for land reform purposes is at least partially 
confiscatory.107 Thus, in its effect, the test used for selecting land 
to be expropriated is really a test for confiscation, and its legitimacy 
must be considered with that result in mind. 
One doctrinal support for the principle that rural land must 
fulfill a social function is the notion that the state holds the under-
lying title to all land. This eminent domain theory was adopted in 
the Mexican Constitution: 
"Ownership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of 
the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which 
has had, and has, the right to transmit title thereof to private 
persons, thereby constituting private property.''108 
The idea is not that the state has all of the rights of ownership in 
all of the land, but rather that the recognition of private rights in 
land came originally from the state and properly depends for its 
continuance upon the satisfaction of community needs.109 Whether 
or not similar language is enacted into law, this original right theory, 
or something akin to it, has had influence in a number of Latin 
American countries.110 
In several land reform laws, there are provisions for the "re-
version" of uncultivated lands to the state.111 One arguable justifi-
cation might be that the state has granted private rights in land sub-
ject to the condition that the land be cultivated; if the condition is 
broken, the ownership reverts. However, there are difficulties with 
106. See Honduras, art. l; Venezuela, preamble; cf. Betancourt, La Reforma 
Agraria, in POSICION Y DoCTRINA 121 (1959). 
107. See sections II and III supra. 
108. These are the first words of article 27. 
109. Two exceptionally good analyses, emphasizing that property rules are rules 
for relations among men, are M. R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 
(1927), and F. S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357 (1954). 
llO. The long colonial period, during which the Spanish crown consistently asserted 
such rights, is surely partly responsible for much of the theory's continued authority. 
Ill. E.g., Bolivia, art. 67; Colombia, ch. VII. The Colombian provision dates from 
a 1936 law, which-depending upon one's point of view-was or was not effective to 
improve the position of the rural poor and to decrease rural violence. For a relatively 
favorable description of the law's effects, see H!RsCHMAN, op. cit. supra note 40, at 
107-13. 
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such reasoning: much of the vacant and uncultivated land in ques-
tion has been in private hands for generations, while the state's 
interest is only now asserted; furthermore, the original grants nor-
mally did not contain express conditions requiring cultivation, ex-
cept in the case of grants of land in colonization programs similar 
to those established by the homestead laws in the United States. 
A more realistic explanation of the recent uncompensated takings 
of uncultivated land is that there has been a frank acceptance of 
governmental responsibility for implementing the social function 
theory. The Bolivian land reform law of 1953, after declaring that 
all land belongs to the nation by "original right," says: "The State 
shall recognize and guarantee private agrarian property where it 
serves a purpose benefiting the national community."112 An easily-
derived corollary is that the state may properly impose sanctions on 
uses of land that it considers anti-social. Those sanctions may stop 
short of expropriation, as in the case of schemes of progressive 
taxation.118 But a more extreme economic sanction is the confisca-
tion of those property rights that are abused. 
North American law1ers, before they register shock, should 
consider such features of our own law as the uncompensated con-
demnation of decaying slums,114 the uncompensated withdrawal of 
public utility franchises for failure to serve the public convenience 
and necessity,115 and even the uncompensated abolition of slav-
ery.116 It is not a sufficient distinction to say that a franchise is not 
112, Bolivia, art. 2. 
113. See text at note 135 infra. 
114. The "public nuisance" theory and its limitations are outlined in Annot., 14 
A.L.R.2d 73 (1950). 
115. It has to be conceded that the instances of such withdrawals are rare. The 
relevant cases tend to approve the principle that franchises may be terminated "for 
cause" (e.g., inadequacy of service or abandonment of the franchise), but most fre-
quently deny the existence of the asserted cause. See cases cited in PuR DIGEST and 
PuR DIGEST (N.S.) (1963) at Franchises, §§ 8, 54, 55, and at Public Utilities, § 3. 
Although the Civil Aeronautics Board has the power to suspend a carrier's service, 
"there has not been a substitution of one trunk carrier by another after a finding of 
inadequate service." STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 
87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY 707 (Comm. Print 1961). 
116. Before and during the Civil War, a great many proposals were made for 
gradual or compensated emancipation. For a variety of such schemes, see CHILD, 
AMERICANS CALLED AFRICANS 102 (1833); COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO 
SLAVERY clxxi-clxxii (1858); COLEMAN, VIRGINIA SILHOUETIES, app., 54-56 (1934); liAu., 
THE Two-FOLD SLAVERY OF THE UNITED STATES (1854); OWEN, THE WRONG OF SLAVERY, 
THE RIGHT OF EMANCIPATION 150-55 (1864). Lincoln's own early preference was for a 
solution that was not confiscatory, and compensation was to be paid to slaveowners in 
the District of Columbia. 12 STAT. 376, 538 (1862). See SELBY, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE 
EVOLUTION OF HIS EMANCIPATION POLICY (1909); WILSON, HISTORY OF ANTISLAVERY 
MEASURES OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH AND THIRTY-EIGHTH UNITED-STATES CONGRESSES: 1861-
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"property" or that one cannot own another man. Conclusory state-
ments of that sort only hinder the analysis of reasons for taking 
some kinds of interests without compensation while requiring com-
pensation for other takings. Instead, the arguments in justification 
of confiscation must be tested by reference to considerations that are 
legislative in nature-"considerations of what is expedient for the 
community concerned."117 It is important to remember that the 
principal "community concerned" is not our own highly developed, 
broadly educated, and well fed community, but a cluster of com-
munities ranging from underdeveloped to undeveloped, from semi-
literate to illiterate, and from underfed to starving.118 In such con-
texts, it is surprising that traditional, Western, legal-constitutional 
protections of property have survived so long. 
We must begin with the goals of the men who create land re-
forms.119 Their basic political motive-to get and keep power-
cannot be denied. The political allure of confiscation as the basis 
for a share-the-wealth program has not been ignored by Latin-
American politicians. In Mexico, confiscatory land reform was a 
huge political success: it stopped the fighting, and it secured the 
65, at 79-91 (1865). The confiscation of property other than slaves was popular on 
both sides, and followed a pattern set by similar legislation in the colonies during the 
Revolutionary War. See VAN TYNE, THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 275-
81, 335-41 (1902). After the Civil War, a presidential amnesty restored much of the 
land confiscated in the South. Before that time, proposals had been made for dividing 
the confiscated land among the freed slaves, in the fashion of what we should now 
call a land reform. See WHmNG, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 469-78 (43d ed. 1871). 
These measures have found their parallel in twentieth-century Latin America, both 
in Zapata's proposal to confiscate the land of opponents of the revolution and in the 
Cuban government's confiscation of property held by Batista adherents and by United 
States interests. These confiscations produced so much land for the Cuban land reform 
that in the first two years of the reform only twenty-five per cent of the area of land 
marshalled for the reform came from the enforcement of the "basic" land reform law. 
See Chonchol, Andlisis Critico de la Reforma Agraria Cubana, 30 EL TRIMESTRE Eco· 
NOMICO 69, 97 (1963). 
117. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881). 
118. This description does not really fit Argentina, Uruguay, some of southern 
Brazil, or important parts of Chile. Its accuracy, even for some of the relatively 
advanced countries of Latin America, is supported by a few representative figures. 
Literacy rates (around 1950): Brazil, 49%; Mexico, 57%; Peru, 47%; Bolivia, 32%: 
Haiti, 11 %· Number of persons per doctor: Argentina, 800; Brazil, 2,500; Guatemala, 
6,400; Haiti, 28,000. The figures are taken from Cabezas de Gonzalez, Diagnostico 
Economico-Social de America Latina, in VISION CRISTIANA DE LA REvoLUCION EN 
AMERICA LATINA at 53, 63 (1962) (special issue of MENSAJE, a Jesuit magazine of 
Santiago); cf. SzuLc, THE WINDS OF REvoLUTION, ch. 2 (1963); Schaefer, Nutrition and 
the Population Explosion in Latin America, in EXPLOSIVE FORCES IN LATIN AMERICA 
127 (TePaske & Fisher ed. 1964). 
119. See Barraclough, supra note 3. 
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loyalty of the rural population to the government.120 Our inquiry, 
however, is not into the popularity of confiscation, but instead into 
justifications that may bear upon its legitimacy. Although the two 
questions surely are not wholly separate, narrowly political argu-
ments are often assumed to lack the moral force that our traditions 
assign to other rationalizations for legislative decisions. Conse-
quently, we must turn to social and economic justifications that 
may have a validity independent of "politics." 
In the long run, land reformers seek to effect a greater equality 
among men. Giving rights in land to the campesinos is instrumental 
. to feeding and housing them better, replacing their old attitudes of 
servility with a new sense of community responsibility, giving them 
a voice in the management of their lives, and giving them an in-
centive to educate their children. Other aims of land reformers are 
to break the restrictions on economic activity that are implicit in 
a hacienda society and to promote the development of the economy, 
partly through increased agricultural production (with some cor-
responding increase in the rural sector's demand for other products)" 
and partly through an improvement in the level of investment. 
Those goals are obviously laudable. However, it is less obvious 
that confiscation is a necessary step in their achievement. Here the 
analysis must be tentative, for the evidence presently available per-
mits little in the way of definite conclusions and even less in the way 
of generalization. In the following discussion, statements are made 
positively in order to avoid the exasperations induced by continual 
hedging. The statements, however, should be taken as examples of 
arguments in justification of confiscatory land reform, and not as 
assertions of tested truth. 
The only large-scale land reforms that have taken place in Latin 
120. The last armed revolt in Mexico is now thirty-five years in the past. See 
HERRING, A HISrORY OF LATIN AMERICA. 372 (2d ed. 1961). There are new population 
pressures on the land, only partially relieved by the bracero program of temporary 
jobs for Mexican migrant workers in the United States. One result has been a new 
series of campesino invasions. See the open letter to the President of the Republic from 
the Regional Livestock. Association of the State of Chihuahua in Excelsior, Mexico 
City, June 2, 1963, p. 17-A; cf. Carroll, The Land Reform Issue in Latin America, in 
LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS 117-20 (Hirschman ed. 1961); 15 HISPANIC 
AMERICAN REPORT 789-91 (1962). Another symptom of unrest is the recent formation of 
an independent-i.e., not tied to the official party-campesino organization, the Central 
Campesino lndependiente, under the nominal leadership of General Cardenas, who 
still symbolizes the vigorous agrarianism of the 1930's as well as an anti-yanqui position 
which is probably more extreme than the General's own views. In any case, the total 
agricultural production in Mexico has been growing (1952-1959) at the remarkable rate 
of 7.1% per year, far outstripping growth rates in countries that have superior land 
resources, such as Argentina and Chile. 
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America-those of Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Cuba-have 
achieved real progress in the highly intangible area of social atti-
tudes. The beneficiaries of the land reforms now regard themselves 
as men, as citizens. They are building schools with their own labor, 
electing their community leaders, and managing their affairs-all 
in striking contrast to the attitudes and activities of the pre-reform 
era.121 Where the rural populations include strong indigenous ele-
ments, steps toward social equality are also steps toward racial 
equality. 
It is the distribution of rights in land, rather than the manner 
of acquisition of the land, that apparently has produced these social 
benefits. It is, therefore, necessary to defend confiscation by arguing 
that distribution would not have been possible if compensation of 
the landowners had been required, for, given the severe limitations 
on the government's resources that inevitably accompany under-
development,122 the only promising source of funds for compensat-
ing the expropriated owners is the distributed land itself. The 
government might exact payments from the beneficiaries of the 
distribution; it might levy a tax on the land's future production; 
or, it might control farm prices in such a way as to effect an indirect 
tax. The obvious problem created by any such decision is that land 
values-whether or not calculated by capitalizing earnings--are 
likely to be high enough that their recapture, through taxes or other 
periodic payments by the beneficiaries, would consume a high pro-
portion of the income the land produces. Accordingly, although the 
beneficiary would be an "owner," his net income would approximate 
day wages. And, to the extent that land values might be juggled 
downward for the benefit of beneficiaries who may have to pay for 
the land, the owners' property would be confiscated. Thus, it is 
readily seen that in a land reform the goals of compensation and 
increased economic equality are, to a significant degree, inconsistent. 
121. See Patch, Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting, in ADAMS, ET AL. 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY 108, 137-51 (1960); FLORES, LAND REFORM AND 
THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 7 (1963). My own observations, particularly in Venezuela, 
but also in Mexico, lend support to these authors' comments. 
122. The one exception is Venezuela; but, even there, the competition for govern-
ment revenues is keen, and it is not surprising that roads, schools, and housing tend to 
be preferred over compensation for the expropriated owners. In the Venezuelan reform, 
for example, only about one-third of the total cost of the land reform in its early years 
went to compensate landowners. The comparable ratio in the postwar Italian land 
reform was only twelve per cent, the rest of the cost going to land development, farm 
credit, and other investments aimed at consolidating the reform. CARROLL, REFLECTIONS 
ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT 2 (English mimeo ed. 1964) 
(Spanish version in 1 TEMAS DEL BID 19 (1964)). 
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In Mexico, increased economic equality did not result, even 
though the distribution of land was confiscatory. The beneficiaries 
did not have to pay for their land directly, but, through market 
controls, the whole agricultural sector of the economy was forced to 
contribute capital for the development of other sectors.123 Yet the 
land reform did produce the social advantages enumerated.124 There-
fore, the implication is that there is no necessary connection between 
the achievement of greater economic equality and the achievement 
of greater social equality; still, it seems doubtful that the social 
benefits would have resulted if the campesinos had not expected 
more than they ultimately received in the way of economic benefits 
from the Revolution. 
The question remains whether any land distribution of sufficient 
scale to produce important social gains can be carried out if com-
pensation is paid. The probationary answer, based mainly upon 
what we know about the Mexican reform, is affirmative, but a 
gloomy qualification that dispels hope for nonconfiscatory solutions 
must be added. The qualification is that a reforming government 
seemingly cannot have land distribution, compensation, and rapid 
industrial growth at the expense of the agricultural sector. If the 
beneficiaries of the land reform are to be bled in order to promote 
non-agricultural development, they cannot, at the same time, finance 
the purchase of the land that has been distributed to them. The 
social and economic cases for confiscation thus blend together, and 
it is to the more strictly economic arguments that we now must turn. 
Economists can construct models for underdeveloped economies 
that show clear gains to be realized from confiscation of property 
in order to divert its income from consumption to investment in a 
forced-draft expansion;125 it behooves laymen not to try to challenge 
the validity of such demonstrations. However, the historical record 
12!1. It is generally assumed that the extractive sectors-agriculture, forestry, mining, 
etc.-must provide an important part of the initial accumulation of capital for a 
developing country's "take-off." See Rosrow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 21-24 
(1960). 
124. One writer comments that it is still true that blue-eyed blondes have the 
advantage in the social pages of Mexico City newspapers, but that for political success 
there is nothing like dark skin. FLORES, REFoRMA AGRARIA. EN MExlco 460 (Univ. of 
Chile mimeo, 1962). 
125. E.g., Bronfenbrenner, The Appeal of Confiscation in Economic Development, 
3 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 201 (1955) (emphasis given to Soviet 
and Chinese experience). Cf. Garnick, "The Appeal of Confiscation" Reconsidered: A 
Gaming Approach to Foreign Economic Policy, 11 EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
CULTURAL CHANGE !15!1 (1963), and Bronfenbrenner, Second Thoughts on Confiscation, 
11 id. at !167. 
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in Latin America remains cloudy, whatever may be the case in 
Eastern Europe. It is true that Mexico has experienced a more rapid 
development than have other Latin-American countries, and, argu-
ably, its largely confiscatory land reform was an important cause of 
the growth. The argument runs as follows: 126 Land reform brought 
an end to the Mexican caste system, giving rural workers new possi-
bilities for improvement of their position and new incentive for 
efforts in that direction. In a horizontal sense, the land reform also 
contributed to an increased mobility; farm workers were able to 
leave the countryside in order to seek city employment.127 The ex-
propriated landowners did not lose all their property; instead, for 
the most part, they retained their investments in urban land. With 
the growth of the cities, this land rapidly increased in value, so that 
much of the former landed class provided a nucleus of capital for 
the new industrialization. Roads and irrigation projects took on 
urgent importance. A major share of the government's meager re-
sources was devoted to these ends and could not be used to com-
pensate expropriated landowners. The construction industry faced 
an unprecedented demand, not only for the items of social overhead 
capital, but also for urban housing. Subsidiary industries developed. 
Also, the abandonment of the hacienda system required its replace-
ment by a market economy in agriculture. Through these changes 
enough internal capital was formed to sustain the nation's growth 
without substantial foreign investment, which was frightened away 
and did not return until World War II. 
The economic growth argument finally comes to this: The 
hacienda society is static, uninterested in investment. A redistribu-
tion of land requires a reorientation of the economy toward "mod-
ern" goals-e.g., profit and full employment-which, in turn, forces 
new investment. With Keynes, the reformers argue that an increase 
in consumption (and thus demand for products) is a function of 
increases in investment. The conclusion is that the Mexican ex-
126. This sanguine picture of the Mexican reform is taken mainly from the writings 
of Dr. Edmundo Flores, whose works are cited frequently in these notes. It is reaffirmed 
by Glade, Revolution and Economic Development, in GLADE 8e ANDERSON, THE PoLIT· 
!CAL ECONOMY OF MEXICO 3, 52-71 (1963); cf. VERNON, THE DILEMMA OF MEXICO'S 
DEVELOPMENT 78-86 (1963); Hirschman, Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin 
America, in LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS 3, 29-35 (Hirschman ed. 
1961). A more general analysis, emphasizing the importance of land distribution in 
encouraging low-level development decisions, is in Raup, The Contribution of Land 
Reforms to Agricultural Development, 12 ECONOMIC DEVELOfMENT AND CULTURAL 
CHANGE I (1963). 
127. Country-to-city migration may also be explained on the basis of the repulsions 
of rural life. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, WHY LAlloR LEAVES THE LAND 
(Studies and Reports, n.s., 1960). 
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perience tends to validate Keynes' thesis that the magnitude of a 
nation's income is a function of the equality of its distribution.128 
Those who urge the foregoing analysis cannot claim that the 
rural population has shared evenly in Mexico's economic growth. 
The opposite seems to be true; if any class may be said to have 
financed the development process in Mexico, the campesino class 
seems a likely candidate.129 Nor can it be claimed that the lands 
distributed in the reform have been substantially more productive 
than they might have been in the absence of a confiscatory distribu-
tion.130 The agriculture that feeds the non-farm population is the 
technically advanced, large-scale agriculture located in areas that 
have never been heavily populated and that were, in great measure, 
outside the area of cultivation at the time of the early distributions 
of land.131 It is arguable, however, that these lands have been opened 
up to production because of the aid of the road-building and irriga-
tion projects that the reform brought and that might not have 
resulted in the absence of a reform. An even more pe!suasive argu-
ment is that these lands might never have been freed for commercial 
agriculture if there had not been a breakup of the haciendas. Finally, 
it is questionable that new foreign capital, particularly new capital 
from the United States, was wholly barred or withheld from the 
Mexican economy during the stated period. 'There are those who 
say that new North American investment continued in very large 
quantities during the Cardenas era through the use of front-men 
who were Mexican, despite local "Mexicanization" requirements and 
despite the threat of confiscation.132 
128. See FLORES, TRATADO DE ECONOMIA AGRICOLA. 89-94 (1961). 
129. This is not to say that the reform has failed to benefit the campesinos. The fall 
in infant mortality in the Mexican countryside surely reflects the basic fact that the 
campesinos began to eat better immediately after the distribution. They had an under-
standable tendency to regard cattle as food rather than as a capital item, with the 
result that herds were decimated at the outset of the reform. See FLORES, op. dt. 
supra note 124, at 455-56. 
130. Dr. Flores notes that much land is being used more intensively because of 
rapid urbanization: industrial uses, dairy farms near cities, and truck farms have all 
increased in number. Those uses, however, are at best indirect results of the land 
distribution. 
131. "Productivity, the basic factor in real income, has risen for the private sector 
of the Laguna economy but, on average, has fallen for the ejidal sector [comprised of 
land distributed in the reform].'' SENIOR, LAND REFoRM AND DEMOCRACY 189 (1958). The 
same author goes on to explain the difference and to warn "against any generalization 
that the cooperative ejido is inherently less productive than the private farm.'' Id. at 
193. (Emphasis added.) Other students of Mexican agriculture, however, are willing to 
make this generalization, at least with respect to historical production levels. Interview 
with Dr. Donald Freebaim, Rockefeller Foundation, in Mexico City, March 27, 1963. 
Out of some five million-plus units of agricultural exploitation in Mexico, around four 
million are estimated to be subsistence farms. Interview with Ing. Arnaldo Lerma 
Anaya, in Mexico City, April 16, 1963. 
132, Such an assertion is hard to verify, because it rests on assumptions about con-
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The trouble with this sort of evaluation is that there is no "con-
trol" nation that sufficiently resembles an unreformed Mexico to 
permit an unqualified assertion that the Mexican reform has or has 
not played an indispensable role in the country's growth. In the 
face of this appeal to history, however, it is proper to consider some 
of the alternatives that have been advanced as measures with which 
to achieve some of the benefits of a confiscatory land reform, without 
some of its disadvantages. 
Two such alternatives can be dismissed as illusory: mechanization 
and colonization. Speaking generally, the introduction of machinery 
does not create substantially greater per-acre productivity; it can 
radically improve productivity per worker, but the chief result is the 
displacement of labor to the urban unemployed class, not a more 
intensive cultivation.133 Machines are costly, particularly when there 
is a large and often-idle rural population available to do the same 
work. Moreover, the use of machinery does not improve the wages 
or the living conditions of rural labor. Colonization, on the other 
hand, can increase production by putting new land to use. Further, 
the living conditions of the beneficiaries of colonization are un-
deniably improved. But the trouble with colonization is its stagger-
ing cost.134 No doubt, effective (though costly) colonization projects 
are possible in some areas, such as the lowlands of Bolivia, where 
fertile lands are underpopulated; nonetheless, to suggest colonization 
as a substitute for the distribution of land is unrealistic in the ex-
treme. 
cealment. Even if it is true, it does not necessarily justify an anti-reform conclusion, 
for it amounts to an assertion that, to an important extent, foreign c_;apital was not 
frightened away by the reform. See VERNON, op. cit. supra note 126, at '22. 
133. One early (1939) study in Mexico indicated only a slight advantage for mecha-
nized farms in per-hectare production, and a substantial advantage per man-day. 
Quoted in SENIOR, op. cit. supra note 131, at 174. The presence of machinery may 
indicate a more businesslike attitude on the part of the individual farmer; that does 
not suggest that mechanization is a general solution to the problem of low production •. 
The introduction of some kinds of machinery, e.g., water pumps in arid areas, may 
put new land to work and cause an increase in the need for labor. See FLORES, TRATADO 
DE EcoNOMIA AGRICOLA 216 (1961). For the view that small farms, using little machinery 
but intensive labor, can be highly efficient, see SCHULTZ, op. cit. supra note 79, at 
122-24. 
134. Officials of the Inter-American Development Bank have privately estimated the 
cost of some colonization projects supported by the Bank at. levels which reach twenty 
thousand dollars to fifty thousand dollars per family settled. Colonization on public land 
avoids some costs, such as those of acquiring privately owned land; but it more than 
makes up for that saving in its demands for social overhead capital items such as roads, 
sanitation facilities, and electric power installations, not to mention housing, schools, 
or even irrigation projects. See Bernal, Land Tenure Problems of Colombia, in LAND 
TENURE 289 (Parsons, Penn &: Raup ed. 1956); cf. FLORES, LAND REFORM AND THE 
ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 8-9 (1963). 
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Certain other alternatives that have been suggested are more 
plausible. They fall into two broad categories, taxation and labor-
tenancy regulation. Even these two may blend together, as in the 
State of Sao Paulo's (Brazil) abortive land reform law, which im-
posed a progressive property tax (according to size of holdings) on 
rural land but excepted from the tax's application landowners who 
complied with detailed regulations of living and working conditions 
for their labor force.135 Viewed abstractly, progressive-rate taxation 
can be just as effective as a land reform in producing a redistribution 
of income. The fact is, however, that income redistribution through 
levelling forms of taxation has historically taken place only in highly 
developed countries. In the underdeveloped world, such a proposal 
is apt not to be taken seriously, principally because no tax system is 
any better than its machinery for administration and enforcement. 
Not only is there a long tradition of tax evasion and official corrup-
tion in these countries, but there is also the usual shortage of trained 
personnel to man the administration that an effective tax system 
demands. Furthermore, taxation is a year-to-year proposition. While 
today's administration may be sympathetic to the goals of a tax re-
form, tomorrow's may take a more relaxed attitude toward enforce-
ment; it is more difficult to undo a redistribution of land. 
Regulations aimed at improving the security, income, and living 
conditions of rural tenants or agricultural laborers are equally sus-
pect in the eyes of reformers who favor more radical solutions, at 
least partly for similar reasons.136 The labor legislation of many 
countries of Latin America is sufficiently advanced that it might 
serve as a model for more developed countries, but its enforcement 
often seems t0 depend upon the presence of a strong union or some 
special political motivation such as an approaching election. Any 
continuing obligation requires supervision, and, at present, there are 
not even enough administrators to run such existing government 
programs as the tax and agricultural extension systems.137 
Ultimately, all these alternative solutions are rejected by some 
135. Law No. 5,994, Dec. 30, 1961. Opponents of this legislation sabotaged it by an 
impressive political end run; they persuaded the National Congress to transfer the 
functions of assessment and collection of property taxes from the states to municipal-
ities, which were more amenable to suggestion from the landowners. For a rosier view 
of tax reform in Latin America, see Martin, Future of the Alliance for Progress, 47 
DEP'T STA.TE BuLL. 951, 955 (1962); cf. Kaldor, Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn 
To Tax1, 41 FOiu:IGN MFA.IRS 410 (1963). 
136. See text accompanying note 81 supra. 
137. Uruguay and Argentina are exceptions, but they do not belong in the same 
class of underdevelopment as the rest of the region. See text accompanying note 82 
supra. 
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radical reformers precisely because they are not sufficiently revolu-
tionary and do not imply destruction of the power of the landed class 
any more than they imply any substantial redistribution of income. 
Those who support a more fundamental kind of land reform argue 
that genuine changes in the pattern of income distribution are not 
possible so long as political and economic power remain in the hands 
of those who would be called upon to give up some of what they 
have.138 Thus, confiscation serves an additional political purpose 
which may be instrumental in achieving the social and economic 
goals of a reform. It is this attitude on the part of fundamental re-
formers which no doubt causes less radical alternatives to be proposed 
by those who stand to lose the most if the radicals have their way. 
So much for the arguments for confiscation. They are presented 
here in their most favorabl~ light, not for purposes of advocacy, but 
rather that they might be seen for what they are: rather traditional 
appeals to traditional values. It should be obvious, however, that 
the arguments lose much of their force when all moderate-sized to 
large rural holdings are confiscated indiscriminately, whether or 
not their ownership has produced the evils that make reform neces-
sary. The legislative principle of the social function of ownership 
comes in here-or, more accurately, ought to come in here. 
Consider first the issue of capital formation. Confiscation does 
not, by itself, form capital. Indeed, the short-range effect of a uni-
formly confiscatory policy is surely the discouragement of private 
investment, both domestic and foreign. But confiscation does give 
control to the government over income produced by the confiscated 
capital, which income can then be invested. A consistent policy limit-
ing confiscation to rural land, the .ownership of which was failing to 
fulfill its social function, would discourage primarily that private in-
vestment which exploits land in a manner that ought to be discour-
aged. However, if the government should be concerned about pre-
venting capital flight or compelling investment of the income derived 
from land that is producing effectively, there are legislative ways 
other than confiscation to achieve the desired ends, such as controls 
over the exportation of capital or tax incentives for local invest-
138. FLORES, op. cit. supra note 134, at 12, arguing that the action of the United 
States in entrusting a social revolution to "the safe conservative element," i.e., the 
various Latin-American governments, "is the same as if Abraham Lincoln had expected 
the Southern slave owners to expropriate themselves.'' Still, the alternatives to working 
with the existing Latin-American governments are not immediately apparent. Cf. 
KAUTSKY, POLITICAL CHANGE IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: NATIONALISM AND CoMMU· 
NISM 47 (1962) (Intellectuals "press for land reform not because of anything it will do 
for the peasants, but because of what it will do to the aristocracy'). 
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ment.130 It seems unwise to take land solely for the purpose of con-
trolling the investment of its income when the land is already 
cultivated intensively by a well-paid and secure labor force. Although 
the threat of expropriation may be useful to a government that 
wishes to encourage local investment, for this purpose expropriation 
ought to be a last resort. 
It was stated earlier that intensive farming, using labor that is 
paid a living wage in cash, is inconsistent with the most basic features 
of the hacienda.140 In the present context, it may be remarked that 
this kind of large-scale commercial farming does not result in the 
evils that justify a land reform: the labor force is mobile in a hori-
zontal sense, for its principal economic tie to the land is a cash wage, 
and, when better wages are offered elsewhere, an economically ra-
tional choice may be made; vertical mobility depends less upon land 
ownership than upon such things as the erosion of social caste bound-
aries, the education of the rural population, and the ability of the 
campesino to comprehend that there is a way up. When ownership 
performs the labor-relations portion of its social function, there is 
no need for a distribution of land title to be the first rung on the 
"agricultural ladder.''141 
Apart from the support offered by the theory of restitution, much 
of the legitimacy of confiscation depends upon faithful adherence to 
the principles that go by the name of "the social function of owner-
ship.'' Tested against that standard, and leaving Mexico aside, the 
only recent land reform in Latin America that can be given high 
marks is that of Venezuela. No doubt it will be said that Venezuela 
is a special case because of the government's revenue from petroleum. 
True enough, Venezuela can better afford to pay compensation than 
can either Bolivia or Cuba. But the foregoing analysis does not 
assume even a relatively wealthy government. The point is, when 
ownership has been fulfilling its social function, there is normally 
no need to expropriate at all, in a confiscatory manner or otherwise.142 
139. See Ross&: CHRISTENSEN, TAX INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY IN MEXICO (1959). The 
administrative problems implicit in a program to prevent capital flight are similar to 
those suggested for other programs of regulation or taxation; see text at note 135 
supra. Enforcement of anti-capital-flight legislation would perhaps be somewhat 
easier, because fewer individuals would require supervision. 
140. See text at note 79 supra. 
141. This is "the time honored scale of tenure rights ranging from the landless 
laborer through tenancy to indebted owner and unencumbered ownership." Parsons, 
Land Reform and Agricultural Development, in LAND TENURE 3, 13 (Parsons, Penn 
&: Raup ed. 1956). 
142. However, even the Venezuelan law (in art. 33) provides for the expropriation 
of land, the ownership of which is fulfilling its social function, "when it becomes 
necessary to organize land in a given place, and when the existence thereat of one or 
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Ownership of that kind is making an effective contribution to the 
nation's development and is not likely to be improved upon by the 
newly distributed ownership interests created during a land reform. 
Any minimal gains realized from the confiscation of these lands will 
be more than offset by the temporary dislocations of the reform 
process and by the harder to calculate, but probably more lasting, 
effects upon private investor psychology. 
Fundamental land reforms have, in the past, proceeded from 
revolutionary governments. It is not easy for such a government to 
heed counsels of moderation, especially when they come from the 
outside, even from investor nations. The degree to which a revolu-
tionary government can limit its confiscations to interests that 
"deserve" to be confiscated will depend upon the measure of its con-
trol over the forces that have made the revolution. This is not a 
question of legitimacy but of power.148 The conclusions reached here 
with regard to the legitimacy of various confiscatory practices are, 
however, based upon justifications as they might appear to an ex-
propriating government; they are not based upon international 
standards, which may be suspect in the eyes of reformers since they 
have been established by capital-exporting nations.14'4 
more properties forms a technical or economic obstacle to proper execution of the 
scheme •••. " In such a case, the most desirable bonds (class "C": IO-year terms, with 
interest at the market rate) are given, and cash payment is made for all improvements, 
livestock, and mortgages incurred for development purposes. An owner in Venezuela 
thus has a motive for arguing that his ownership has fulfilled its social function; and, 
even though he may not expect to prevent expropriation, he may convince the court 
that he deserves this less confiscatory form of compensation. See the record cited in 
note 91 supra. A similar provision is contained in Honduras, art. 42, copied in part 
from the Venezuelan law. 
143. This article might have contained another section, dealing with confiscation 
as a form of punishment. Confiscation on this basis, urged by Zapata against opponents 
of the Revolution, see note 20 supra, has been' used widely only by the government of 
Cuba, although other countries have also enacted "malversation" laws aimed at recover-
ing the ill-gotten gains of ousted dictators and their friends. See Perez Jimenez v. 
Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914, petition for 
rehearing denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963), discussing the charges of malversation against 
the former Venezuelan dictator in an extradition proceeding. Concerning confiscation 
as a political weapon, see CuBA AND THE RuLE OF I.Aw 110-ll, 123-25, 241-45 (Int'! 
Comm'n of Jurists, 1962). Because theories of war indemnity and punishment are 
apt to become identified with the need to reduce the power base of the political 
opposition, such theories may be irresistibly attractive to a revolutionary govern-
ment. The informal execution of punitive confiscations in Cuba lends little support 
for the legitimacy of the theory. 
144. For a modern effort to formulate standards that are appropriate for develop-
ing nations' expropriations in connection with social reform, see COMM. ON INT'L 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT (A.B.A.), THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED 
ABROAD (1963); Dawson &: Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A Universal 
Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 727 (1962); Sohn &: Baxter, Responsi-
bility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 
553 (1961); cf. Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 AM. J. lNT'L L. 585 (1961). The tradi-
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V. THE UTILITY OF RATIONALIZATIONS 
One way or another, every land reform in Latin America has been 
confiscatory.145 Granting that, why do grown men engage in elaborate 
let's-pretend games in order to avoid the charge of confiscation? 
A predictable reply is that the reforming governments are afraid 
to irritate the governments and private investing interests of investor 
countries such as the United States. But, although it is undoubtedly 
true that international respectability is important even to revolution-
ary governments, this explanation is misleadingly over-simple. North 
American interests that are affected by a land reform are not so 
unsophisticated that they will fail to notice the extent to which their 
property is confiscated; nor are they likely to fail to call the attention 
of the United States Government to their plight. The word will 
quickly pass among private investors and international lending 
agencies, who will certainly look beyond self-serving descriptions by 
the reforming governments to the effects of their reforms. Yet it 
would be wrong to dismiss the various rationalizations for confisca-
tion as unimportant to development. Although the connections may 
be m·ore easily felt than articulated, an attempt to identify them i& 
worth a try. 
Whatever the degree of state control over the economy, develop-
ment depends upon a great many decisions, the making of which is 
often necessarily decentralized. Planning at any level, public or 
private, is likely to be successful in fairly direct proportion to the 
predictability of the future. Decisions that promote development, 
particularly decisions to save or invest, are easier to make in a climate 
of relative stability and security, and those terms imply predictions 
about the future. Like all expressions of probabilty, assertions about 
security are estimates based upon incomplete knowledge and, there-
fore, are not helpful unless they are explicitly identified with the 
standpoint of some observer. For the purposes of the present analysis 
a variety of observers must be considered, not all of whom share the 
same perspective. The expropriated owner of a hacienda will not be 
deceived into thinking that compensation in long-term agrarian 
bonds, at a valuation based upon the hacienda's history of low pro-
duction, is the same as immediate payment in cash for the land's 
tional international standard of prompt, full, and effective compensation was advocated 
in an aide-memoire to the Guatemalan government, protesting, among other things, 
the use of agrarian bonds for compensation. Expropriation of United Fruit Company 
Property by Government of Guatemala, 29 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 357 (1953); cf. Kunz, The 
Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 327, 349-59 (1940). 
145. Here "land reform" is equated-as it should be-with "fundamental" reforms. 
See note 90 supra and text accompanying notes 1-3 supra. 
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market value. But his estimate of the future-his security-is the 
least of our concerns. Instead, the reforming government ought to 
worry about the effect of its reforms upon other investors in the 
agricultural and other sectors of the economy. What effect will the 
rationalizations for confiscation have upon the investment decisions 
of the efficient operator of a large-scale agricultural enterprise, or of 
the banker who is considering an agricultural loan, or of the small 
farmer who is thinking about buying a tractor? How will those ra-
tionalizations affect decisions to buy, build, or finance urban hous-
ing? How will they affect decisions to finance the expansion of manu-
facturing plant capacity? 
It is necessary to narrow these questions even further and to 
relate them to particular rationalizations. Deferred payment and 
reduced valuation are sufficiently transparent that they can fool only 
those decision-makers at the very lowest levels of sophistication; 
certainly, they will not fool the entrepreneurs and lending institu-
tions who will make the most important individual decisions to save 
or invest. But the other basic rationalizations-the theory of restitu-
tion and the doctrine of the social function of ownership-do not 
rest upon delusion. They do reinforce investment security because 
they give important assurance about the future to potential investors. 
The great beauty of the restitution theory is that it purports to 
protect property interests, restoring to the "true" owners what is 
their own. In operation, restitution may have an equalizing effect, 
but it is not explicitly premised upon achieving equality. It is, by 
its own terms, not so likely to recur and, therefore, not so likely to 
raise those insecurities about which Bentham warned a century and 
more ago: 
"If equality ought to prevail to-day it ought to prevail always .... 
How make another distribution without taking away from each 
that which he has? And how despoil any without attacking the 
security of all? When your new repartition is disarranged-that 
is to say, the day after its establishment-how avoid making a 
second? Why not correct it in the same way? And in the mean-
time what becomes of security? What is happiness? Where is 
industry?"146 • 
One important reason why Mexico's post-reform economy even-
tually prospered was that potential investors were convinced that the 
land reform did not imply a governmental dedication to continual 
leveling. The fact that investments in urban land and most industrial 
146. BENTIIAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 119-20 (1876). (The two quotations are 
reversed in order. The citation is to Hildreth's 1908 re-translation from the French 
version of Dumont.) 
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investments were left untouched was important not only in leaving a 
reservoir of capital to be invested, but also in giving security to in-
vestors of the future. 
The social function doctrine is even more useful. As that doctrine 
is now interpreted, one of the principal grounds for expropriation 
is inadequate investment. Conversely, if the social function principle 
is carefully applied, one who invests knows that his investment is 
secure as long as he produces effectively and compensates his labor 
force adequately. These are capitalist virtues; just as the Mexican 
Revolution "laid the bases of Mexican capitalism,"147 so all the 
reforming governments of Latin America-with Cuba the lone 
exception-have made it clear that they propose, not the abandon-
ment of capitalism, but rather an adjustment to make of modern 
capitalism an effective successor to the curious combination of mer-
cantilism and feudalism that prevailed before.148 
In this process even deception has its place. The pretense that 
compensation is being made to the expropriated landowners may, for 
example, help to assure the beneficiaries of the land distribution 
that their own titles are secure-that the land has been purchased, 
not stolen, from its former owners. A small farmer whose title is 
secure is more likely to save and invest than is his counterpart who 
lacks confidence in his future as an owner. I£ the establishment of 
security of tenure for the reform's beneficiaries is an important ob-
jective of a reforming government, then it is not objectionable to try 
to reinforce the beneficiaries' legal protections with the psychological 
support that may come from the fiction of compensation for land-
owners. For the small farmer as well as for the industrial investor, 
security is first of all a state of mind. 
Apart from the direct encouragement of low-level development 
decisions, there is another more important reason for maintaining the 
myth of compensation. A social revolution, whether or not it is 
accompanied by widespread violence, is necessarily disorderly and 
disruptive. The maintenance of order is the first great task of a 
revolutionary government, and it is as important as any task that faces 
a non-revolutionary government that seeks to make its social revolu-
tion without violence. In the countries of Latin America, most of 
147. Carlos Fuentes, quoted in Hirschman, supra note 126, at 31. 
148. This position recalls Franklin D. Roosevelt, who once described the New Deal 
as "a revolution of the Right" to save capitalism. The New Dealers, many of them 
lawyers, knew the value of tying their social reforms to precedent. See Freund, Social 
Justice and the Law, in SOCIAL JusnCE 93, 116-17 (Brandt ed. 1962): "The accommoda-
tion between stability and change is representative of the ultimate task of the law-the 
resolution of the ambiguities and antinomies of human aspirations •••• " 
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which have seen major upheavals in every generation since their 
independence, the need for stability is particularly acute. Stability 
implies respect for law, either voluntary or coerced or-surely most 
typically-a mixture of both. Any open disavowal by the government 
of one of the institutions of the established order carries with it the 
risk of a lessening of public respect for the order generally. Open 
confiscation of rural land does not compel other repudiations of 
established rights, but it does make those repudiations politically 
.more difficult to resist. To the extent that confiscation is successfully 
disguised, the leaders of a reforming government may reduce the 
popular pressure for immediate, disruptive extension of the social 
revolution to every comer of the nation and may, at the same time, 
avoid the invitation to lawlessness that is implicit in a frankly con-
fiscatory reform.149 
Finally, even if all efforts to conceal the confiscatory nature of 
a land reform fail, there is some utility in continuing to assert the 
principle of compensation. There is no intention on the part of any 
reforming government in Latin America to abandon the rule of just 
compensation as a principle of posHeform general application. The 
period of a land reform is a period of social emergency; that emer-
gency will not last forever. If it is necessary during the emergency 
to subordinate one or another constitutionally protected interest, 
it is probably better to do so covertly, all the while professing the 
continued vitality of the constitutional protections. When the emer-
gency passes, it will perhaps be easier to give real protection to those 
interests than it might be if they had been frankly disavowed during 
the time of crisis. Our own constitutional history can provide models 
that will serve very well.150 
Latin-American opinion makers, educated in Western traditions 
of legality, find confiscation distasteful and difficult to admit even to 
themselves. Thus, the needs of the collective conscience of the leader-
ship group combine with the indispensable demands of orderly 
development to require formal repudiation of confiscation. While 
it seems to be true that "either we pay for the land or we make a 
land reform,"151 the need to rationalize the reform with traditional 
standards of legitimacy makes deception inevitable. 
149. Even in the Soviet Union, the expropriation of property is now compensated 
at "market" value (in the case of immovables, a fixed price controlled by the govern-
ment). 2 GsovsKI, SovIET CIVIL LAw 79-81 (1949). 
150. Compare Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), and Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944), with Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); cf. Warren, The 
Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 181, 191-93 (1962). 
151. CHONCHOL, LA REFORMA AGRARIA EN AMERICA LATINA 26 (Univ. of Chile, 
mimeo, 1962). 
